South Carolina Law Review
Volume 62

Issue 2

Article 2

Winter 2010

Climate Change and the Public Law Model of Torts:
Reinvigorating Judicial Restraint Doctrines
Donald G. Gifford
University of Maryland

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Donald G. Gifford, Climate Change and the Public Law Model of Torts: Reinvigorating Judicial Restraint
Doctrines, 62 S. C. L. Rev. 201 (2010).

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Gifford: Climate Change and the Public Law Model of Torts: Reinvigorating

CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE PUBLIC LAW MODEL OF TORTS:
REINVIGORATING JUDICIAL RESTRAINT DOCTRINES
DONALD G. GIFFORD

I.

INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................

202

II. THE PUBLIC LAW MODEL AND TORT LAW ................................................
207
A. Constitutionaland Statutory Law and the Public Law Model ............ 207
B. The Public Law Model and First-GenerationMass
P roducts Torts.....................................................................................
209
III. THE EMERGENCE OF MACRO-REGULATORY TORT LITIGATION................. 212

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

State Government Tobacco Litigation.................................................
Municipal LitigationAgainst Handgun Manufacturers......................
Rhode IslandLead PigmentLitigation................................................
Climate Change Litigation..................................................................
The Public Law Model and the New Genre ofPublic
Policy-Making Tort Litigation ............................................................

212
213
215
216
219

IV. PUBLIC INTEREST TORT LITIGATION AND THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION.......... 222

A.

The Limits of the JudicialFunction.....................................................
1. JudiciallyDiscoverable and ManageableStandards...................
2. The PolycentricNature of Climate Change Litigation.................
3. JudicialCompetence and Public Interest Torts ...........................
B. Separationof Powers ..........................................................................

223
225
227
228
229

V. DOCTRINAL EXIT RAMPS FOR PUBLIC PRODUCTS LITIGATION................. 232
A. Dismissal on Substantive Grounds:Public Nuisance ......................... 233
B. "Remote and Derivative" Harms........................................................
238
VI. APPLYING JUDICIAL RESTRAINT DOCTRINES TO CLIMATE CHANGE
LITIGATION .................................................................................................

A . Standing ..............................................................................................
1. Purposes Served by the Standing Doctrine ..................................

240
240
240

*
Edward M. Robertson Research Professor of Law, University of Maryland. Earlier
versions of this paper were presented at Northwestern University Law School, the Annual Judicial
Symposium of the National Foundation for Judicial Excellence, the Institute for Legal Reform's
Climate Change Litigation Roundtable, and a "Half Baked" Faculty Workshop at the University of
Maryland School of Law. I thank the participants at each of these sessions for their comments. I
also am grateful for the suggestions of Oscar Gray, Richard Boldt, Bob Condlin, Bill Reynolds, and
Bill Richman. Finally, I thank Natalie Waryck, Meredith Schreibfcder, and Andrew Murad for their
research and editorial assistance.

201

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

1

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 2

202

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

B.

[VOL. 62: 201

2. Standing in Climate Change Litigation........................................
The Political Question Doctrine .........................................................
1. Purposes Served by the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine ...................
2. Climate Change Litigationand the PoliticalQuestion
Doctrine........................................................................................
3. Beyond Global Warming: The Political Question Doctrine and
Public Nuisance ProductsLitigation............................................

V II. C ONCLU SION ..............................................................................................

I.

243
248
248
250
256
257

INTRODUCTION

"Faux legislation"' is back in fashion. A decade ago, former Secretary of
Labor, Robert B. Reich, a progressive scholar and commentator, coined this
phrase to describe the federal government's efforts to sue manufacturers of
cigarettes and handguns when a deadlocked Congress refused to regulate tobacco
"death sticks" and weapons that teenage boys used "to shoot up high schools." 2
Reich warned that these well-meaning legal actions, initiated by an
administration that he once served, threatened to "sacrifice[] democracy." 3 A
decade later, frustrated by a stalemated Congress's inability to address global
climate change,4 environmentalists, state attorneys general, and mass plaintiffs'
attorneys are again turning to the courts, this time to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions.5 The federal courts reached conflicting results in the early climate
he United States
Supreme Court recently granted
change lawsuits ,6 and theUie
ttsSpeeCutrcnl
rne

1.

Robert B. Reich, Don't Democrats Believe in Democracy?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2000, at

2.

Id.

3.
4.

Id.
See Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Effort for Climate Bill in

A22.

Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2010, at A15 (discussing the Senate's failure to advance a climate
change bill).
5. See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859-60 (5th Cir. 2009) (reversing
the district court's dismissal of a class action that Gulf Coast property owners brought seeking
damages from energy, chemical, and fuel companies whose emissions allegedly exacerbated the
ferocity of Hurricane Katrina); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 314-15 (2d Cir.
2009) (reversing the dismissal of an action seeking abatement of the defendant power companies'
contributions to global warming); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d
863, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (dismissing action seeking damages from twenty-four oil, energy, and
utility companies for their excessive emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases);
California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at * 1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17,
2007) (dismissing action seeking damages from automakers contributing to global warming).
6. Compare Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 315 ("We hold that the district court erred in
dismissing the complaints [of states, a municipality, and land trusts] on political question grounds;
that all of [the p]laintiffs have standing; that the federal common law of nuisance governs their
claims; [and] that [the p]laintiffs have stated claims under the federal common law of
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certiorari to review the Second Circuit's decision in one of these cases. The
central questions before the Court will be ones of standing and whether the
federal common law of nuisance provides an implied cause of action under the
Clean Air Act even though the Act assigns responsibilit for regulating such
emissions to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). But the overarching
issue is a different one: Within our constitutional framework, and consistent with
the separation of powers and the limits of the judicial function, can courts use the
vague standards of tort law to impose detailed regulations on a group of
businesses allegedly contributing to a problem that is literally worldwide in
scope?
In Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.,9 the Second Circuit allowed

a public nuisance action to proceed against the six largest electric utility
companies serving the heavily populated northeastern quadrant of the United
States. 10 If this litigation continues, a federal district court judge will someday
become an extraordinarily powerful judicial regulator, setting emission standards
for these utilities. While the defendants allegedly contribute to climate change
that is global in scope, the plaintiffs themselves allege that the defendants
contribute only 2.5% of all man-made greenhouse gas emissions. 12 Unless the
judge turns out the lights, it seems likely that any court-ordered remedy would
reduce man-made emissions by only a modest fraction of this amount.
Undoubtedly, similar lawsuits are on the way. In fact, this theory of liability
applies not only to businesses but to anyone whose activities emit greenhouse
gases, including those of us who drive automobiles or heat our homes with
fossil fuels.
This is not the first season of faux legislation. Beginning with the states'
litigation against tobacco manufacturers in the mid-1990s, state attorneys

nuisance .... "), with Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 598 F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 2010) (vacating
decision of three-judge panel that reversed the district court's dismissal for lack of standing and
presentation of a non-justiciable political question), Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 868 (dismissing
public nuisance claims on standing and political question grounds), and Gen. Motors Corp., 2007
WL 2726871, at *16 (dismissing federal common law nuisance claims on political question
grounds).
7.

Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d 309, cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010)

(No. 10-174).

When the six electric power company defendants petitioned the Court seeking

reversal of the Second Circuit's decision to allow Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. to

proceed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3092 (U.S. Aug 2, 2010) (No. 10-174), the Obama Administration surprised
many observers by joining the petitioners in urging the Supreme Court to accept certiorari and
reverse the decision of the Second Circuit. See Brief for Tennessee Valley Authority as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 582 F.3d 309 (No. 10-174), 2010 WL 3337661.
8. 79 U.S.L.W 3342 (2010).
9. 582 F.3d 309, cert. granted,79 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174).
10. Id. at 314-15.
11. Id. at 314 (quoting Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268
(S.D.N.Y. 2005)).

12. Id. at 347 (reiterating the plaintiffs assertion that the defendant companies "allegedly
account for 2.5% ofman-made carbon dioxide emissions" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

13. See infra Part III.A.
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general and their partners, a small group of plaintiffs' attorneys specializing in
mass products torts, consciously viewed these lawsuits as filling the void left by
the political branches' abdication of regulatory responsibility. 14 John Coale, one
of the private attorneys that assisted in government lawsuits against tobacco and
gun manufacturers,1 5 explained that "[the government] failed to regulate tobacco
and they failed regarding guns. . . . Congress is not doing its job.... [L]awyers
are taking up the slack." 16 Together with the State of Rhode Island's lawsuit
against the manufacturers of lead pigment 7-exposure to which may cause
childhood lead poisoning-18 and similar legal actions against handgun
manufacturers, 19 the tobacco litigation represented the first wave of what I call
"public interest tort litigation," tort-centered examples of Robert A. Kagan's
"adversarial legalism," the uniquely American phenomenon of attempting to
establish government policy through litigation.
The perceived failures of
legislatures and regulatory agencies to address global climate change and public
health problems resulting from cigarette smoking and lead paint exposure
created what Kagan refers to as a "mismatch between a changing legal culture
and an inherited set of political attitudes and structures."21
This Article argues that the public law model of tort litigation is the wrong
tool for the job of addressing climate change and that wise judges should use the
traditional doctrines of judicial restraint to reject the invitation to engage in faux
legislation. Part II begins by describing the "public law model" that Abram
Chayes first identified in the mid-1970s" when federal courts heard numerous
school desegregation cases, as well as litigation to reform prisons and mental
hospitals. Next, this Article discusses David Rosenberg's suggestion to extend
the public law model to the world of torts, but only as a means of affording
compensation to those suffering from latent diseases caused by exposure to toxic
substances such as asbestos. Finally, Part II considers Linda Mullenix's critique
of the efforts of Rosenberg and others to fit mass tort litigation into Chayes's
public law model. I conclude that Mullenix is correct when she argues that the

14. See John Coale, Castano Tobacco Litig. Grp., Government-Sponsored RegulationWhat's Next?, Remarks at the Manhattan Institute Conference Series No. 1 (June 22, 1999), in
Regulation By Litigation: The New Wave of Government-Sponsored Litigation 53-54 (Ctr. for
Legal Policy at the Manhattan Inst. ed., 1999), available at http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/pdf/mics1.pdf.
15. See id. at 51.
16. Id. at 64.

17. State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 434 (R.I. 2008).
18. Id. at 437.
19. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1147-48 (Ill. 2004)
(holding that the city and county failed to state a cause of action for public nuisance against firearms
manufacturers, distributors, and dealers).
20.

See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERIcAN WAY OF LAW 9-14

(2001).
21.
22.

Id. at 40.
See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.

1281 (1976).
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asbestos litigation and other examples of "traditional" mass products torts during
the 1980s and early 1990s do not meet the criteria of Chayes's model.
Part III traces the development of public interest tort ligation, beginning with
its origins in the states' tobacco litigation, continuing through the cycles of
litigation against the manufacturers of handguns and lead pigment, and
concluding with the current round of climate change litigation. With each
successive round, public interest tort litigation became increasingly directed
toward establishing an alternative regulatory regime when Congress or state
legislatures failed to regulate effectively. The tobacco litigation ended with a
settlement that provided the blueprint for tobacco regulation for a full decade. 2 3
States and municipalities asked for similar judicially-imposed regulatory regimes
in the handgun, lead paint, and climate change litigation.
Neither legislation nor administrative regulations provided a basis for
determining when businesses would be held liable in these actions or set
standards for their obligations under the remedial decrees. To handle these tasks,
a new variant of tort law evolved, which more closely resembles Chayes's public
law model than it does traditional tort law, even the asbestos litigation and other
mass torts of the 1980s. Public interest tort litigation addresses large-scale social
problems, not individual injuries or aggregations of individual injuries.24 The
plaintiff is either a state or municipal government or some other collective
entity.25 The substantive claim, usually public nuisance, conceives of the harm
suffered as a collective harm, not an individual injury.
Unlike earlier public interest litigation where courts derived their authority
from constitutional provisions or federal statutes, in public interest tort actions,
trial court judges base their exercise of power on judge-made common law,

23.

See Master Settlement Agreement, NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., http://www.naag.

org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-pdf/ [hereinafter MSA].
24. See Chayes, supra note 22, at 1302 ("The subject matter of [a public interest tort] lawsuit
is not a dispute between private individuals about private rights, but a grievance about the operation
of public policy.").
25. See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009) ("The plaintiffs,
residents and owners of lands and property along the Mississippi Gulf coast, filed this putative class
action in the district court against the named defendants, corporations that have principal offices in
other states but are doing business in Mississippi.... The plaintiffs' putative class action asserts
claims for compensatory and punitive damages based on Mississippi common-law actions of public
and private nuisance. . . ."); NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d. 435, 446 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)
("[T]he National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP")[] is suing for
injunctive relief on its own behalf and that of its individual and potential members in the state of
New York. The theory is one of public nuisance under New York state law."); District of Columbia
v. Beretta, U.S.A., Corp., 872 A.2d 633, 637 (D.C. 2005) (en banc) ("The District of Columbia and
nine individual plaintiffs appeal from the dismissal of their suit against manufacturers or distributors
of firearms alleging common-law negligence and public nuisance ....
); State v. Lead Indus.
Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 434 (R.I. 2008) ("In this landmark lawsuit, filed in 1999, the then Attorney
General, on behalf of the State of Rhode Island (the state), filed suit against various former lead
pigment manufacturers and the Lead Industries Association (LIA) .

. .

. This monumental lawsuit

marked the first time in the United States that a trial resulted in a verdict that imposed liability on
lead pigment manufacturers for creating a public nuisance.").
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sometimes generated by the particular judges themselves. The public nuisance
tort, because it often is vaguely defined, offers a high degree of discretion to the
judge committed to solving social problems. Finally, at least in the climate
change and lead pigment litigation, the most recent iterations of public interest
tort law, the objectives of the state attorneys general and other attorneys
representing the plaintiffs have been to impose regulatory regimes where the
legislature has stalemated, or even to supplant legislation that the attorneys
general do not believe goes far enough. This Article proceeds to argue that this
new genre of tort litigation fits snugly within Chayes's public law model.
My reading of the evidence as a non-scientist is that global warming is
occurring, human contributions of greenhouse gases are playing a substantial
role in this process, and the consequences of global climate change are likely to
be significant, if not cataclysmic, in the century to come.26 Like others who are
concerned about global climate change, I too am frustrated that Congress, the
EPA, and the international community are not working more effectively to
ameliorate its effects. But for me, nagging questions remain about climate
change litigation and other public interest tort actions. Is it really possible for
courts, using principled, judicial standards, to decide whether alleged corporate
tortfeasors should pay to correct society-wide or even worldwide problems? Are
such adjudications consistent with the proper role of common law courts within
our constitutional framework? Part IV suggests overarching principles that
should guide courts in answering these questions.
Part V examines the predecessor of climate change litigation, claims brought
by states and municipalities against manufacturers of products, such as handguns
and lead pigment. In this earlier cycle of public interest tort litigation, state
attorneys general first pioneered the use of the public nuisance tort in their
attempts to regulate industries so as to prevent or remediate society-wide public
health and safety problems. Courts almost inevitably dismissed these actions
because of plaintiffs' inability to satisfy the substantive requirements of the
principal collective tort, public nuisance; the conflict between the common law
actions and legislative enactments already in place; or the fact that any harm
sustained by the states or municipalities was too "remote" from the
manufacturers' conduct or too "derivative" to justify liability. Lurking behind
the dismissals on any of these grounds, I find judicial discomfort with the idea
that plaintiffs had asked the courts to take on fundamentally administrative or
legislative tasks.

26.

See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:

SYNTHESiS REPORT 30-33, 37, 46-48 (Rajendra K. Pachauri et al. eds., 2008), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf (addressing causes, effects, and future
consequences of climate change). A significant percentage of Americans reject these conclusions.
See 61% Say Finding New Energy Sources More Important Than Conservation, RASMUSSEN
REPORTS (Aug. 28, 2010), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public content/politics/current
events/environment energy/energy update.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol62/iss2/2

6

Gifford: Climate Change and the Public Law Model of Torts: Reinvigorating

2010]

CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE PUBLIC LAW MODEL OF TORTS

207

The current climate change litigation is an even more ambitious
manifestation of the public law model of torts. Part VI suggests that the
application of two specific doctrines of judicial restraint, standing and the
political question doctrine, could enable courts to decline jurisdiction of these
matters, which Congress and the administrative agencies it creates should
handle. These judicial restraint doctrines developed in a far different context
than common law tort actions between private parties, but their underlying
purposes justify their application to this entirely new phenomenon of public
interest tort actions. Plaintiffs' goals in public interest tort suits may be
admirable, or even noble, but the only tool in their kit, adversarial litigation, is
uniquely ill-suited to the task. Thus, there is wisdom in the traditional limits
courts have placed on themselves. These limits, the judicial restraint doctrines,
can give the judges a principled basis to decline the invitation to engage in faux
legislation.
II. TIE PUBLIC LAW MODEL AND TORT LAW
A.

Constitutionaland Statutory Law and the Public Law Model

The mid-1970s saw the zenith of the adjudication practices that some
conservatives and business spokespersons referred to as "judicial activism." 27
Federal judges ran entire school systems, prison systems, and state mental
hospitals.3 0 In the midst of this flurry of reform-minded judicial activity, Abram
Chayes wrote his now classic article, The Role of the Judge in Public Law

Litigation.3 1 Chayes described a new form of litigation that was centered in the
federal courts and that was far different from the traditional lawsuit intended to
"settl[e] disputes between private parties about private rights."32 Chayes called

27.

See generallyErnest A. Young, JudicialActivism and Conservative Politics,73 U. COLO.

L. REv. 1139 (2002) (defining six categories of judicial activism); Keenan D. Kmiec, Comment,
The Origin and Current Meanings of "Judicial Activism," 92 CALIF. L. REv. 1441 (2004)

(discussing the various historical and modem meanings ofjudicial activism).
28. See Philip B. Kurland, "Brown v. Board of Education Was the Beginning:" The School
DesegregationCases in the United States Supreme Court: 1954 1979, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 309,

322 (1979) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown ll), 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1954)).
29. See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING
AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 27-143, 362-80

(1998) (analyzing the judiciary's role in prison reform); Daryl R. Fair, PrisonReform by the Courts,
in GOVERNING THROUGH COURTS 149, 149-58 (Richard A.L. Gambitta et al. eds., 1981)
(concluding that courts have the capacity to implement prison reform).
30. See, e.g., Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1203-12 (N.D. Ohio 1974)
(implementing minimum constitutional standards at maximum security facility for the criminally
insane); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 379-86 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (implementing similar
treatment standards in reforming state mental institutions).
31. Chayes, supra note 22.
32. Id. at 1282-84.
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this new form of adjudication "public law litigation" 33 and characterized it as "a
grievance about the operation of public policy." 34 He delineated several other
characteristics of public law litigation, including:
The fact inquiry is not historical and adjudicative but predictive and
legislative.
... Relief is not conceived as compensation for past wrong in a form

logically derived from the substantive liability and confined in its
impact to the immediate parties; instead, it is forward looking, fashioned
ad hoc on flexible and broadly remedial lines, often having important
consequences for many persons including absentees.

... The decree does not terminate judicial involvement in the affair: its
administration requires the continuing participation of the court. 35
Three years later, Owen M. Fiss offered a distinct, but largely
complementary, analysis of the same litigation that Chayes analyzed. 36 To Fiss,
the critical aspect of the high-profile reform litigation of the 1960s and 1970s
was that it constituted "structural reform." 37 He argued that sometimes "our
constitutional values cannot be fully secured without effectuating basic changes
in the structures of [large-scale] organizations" that affect "the quality of our
social life." 38 Fiss contended that what had changed was not the function of
adjudication, but rather the forms that adjudication now took because of the
necessity to address problems in "a society dominated by the operation of largescale organizations." In short, both Chayes and Fiss saw profound changes in
litigation in the federal courts during the civil rights area; however, Fiss viewed
the changes through a different lens than Chayes did.
In his advocacy for this new form of public law litigation, Chayes explicitly
noted that its object was the "vindication of constitutional or statutory
policies." 40 He made no mention of public law litigation derived from a different
source of law, judge-made or common law. In "reconcil[ing] adjudication in the
new model with the majoritarian premises of American political life," Chayes
argued that in cases seeking relief under federal statutes, "the problem . . . is not

33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. at 1302.
Id.
Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
37. See id. at 2-5.
38. Id. at 2.
39. Id. at 36.
40. Chayes, supra note 22, at 1284.
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difficult." 41 Chayes reasoned, "The courts can be said to be engaged in carrying
out the legislative will, and the legitimacy of judicial action can be understood to
rest on a delegation from the people's representatives." 42 Constitutional claims,
continued Chayes, typically arise in a context when the government acts
affirmatively, such as in its operation of schools, prisons, and mental
institutions. 3 The public law model ensures that the government conducts these
activities in a constitutional manner.44 Interestingly, Fiss appeared to be more
open to extending this new genre of more activist litigation to claims arising
under the common law. According to Fiss, "[c]onstitutional adjudication is the
most vivid manifestation" of the courts' role in "giv[ing] meaning to our public
values." But, he argues, this role "also seems [evident in] most civil and
criminal cases, certainly now and perhaps for most of our history as well." 45
B.

The Public Law Model and First-GenerationMass Products Torts

In 1984, David Rosenberg called for the extension of the public law model
to the handling of mass tort claims, 46 where the plaintiffs rights were almost
always derived from judge-made common law-not statutory or constitutional
sources. 47 Rosenberg focused on mass tort claims, 48 which included both those
seeking damages for diseases resulting from exposure to mass products, such as
asbestos, 49 Agent Orange,5 0 and DES,51 and those claiming damages as a result
of environmental exposure to harmful substances, such as the release of harmful
radiation at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant.52 Rosenberg's greatest
concern regarding the traditional handling of tort claims was the requirement that

41. Id. at 1314.
42.

See id.

43. See id. at 1314-15.
44. Id.

45. Fiss, supranote 36, at 29.
46.

David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "PublicLaw"

Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 851, 905-24 (1984).
47. See id. at 854.
48.

Id. at 853.

49. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1081 (5th Cir. 1973)
(affirming judgment in favor of estate of decedent whose death was caused by asbestos exposure);
Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 652-53 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (setting a trial plan for
personal injury and wrongful death class action against asbestos manufacturers).
50. See, e.g., Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.), 618 F.
Supp. 623, 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (approving settlement agreement for Agent Orange class action
suit); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1228, 1264 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(dismissing product liability claims of Vietnam veterans and family members).
51. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 930-31, 936-38 (Cal. 1980) (allowing
the plaintiff to proceed against DES manufacturers on a market share liability basis); Hymowitz v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1071-72 (N.Y. 1989) (same).
52. See In re Three Mile Island Litig., 557 F. Supp. 96, 96-97 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (establishing
twenty-five million dollar fund for compensating victims exposed to radiation and for related public
health purposes).
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any particular plaintiff be able to prove that a specific defendant caused her
harm.53 As Rosenberg noted, this traditional requirement of tort liability cannot
be satisfied when the victim develops a disease caused by exposure to a fungible
product produced by several manufacturers, decades after the exposure. 54
Rosenberg also argued that because of the inability of most victims to prove the
individualized causation requirement, defendants would not be assessed the
amount of damages to deter them from harmful conduct in the
appropriate
ftture. 5 His solution was to employ a "public law model" to avoid the
traditional, particularized causation requirement and to overcome "systemic
causal indeterminacy." 56 Rosenberg envisioned that his public law model of
torts would serve a parallel function to Chayes's model-regulating institutions,
albeit private institutions instead of public institutions. 57 Rosenberg noted that
such a model also would substantially reduce the litigation costs involved in any
repetitive series of individual adjudications.
Rosenberg's public model of tort law began with the use of class actions in
mass torts and the elimination of the requirement that any particular victim prove
that any specific manufacturer's product caused her harm. 9 Damages would be
awarded to the class of victims as a whole,60 and then distributed according to a
damages schedule similar to those traditionally used in the workers'
compensation system.61 Future victims would be able to receive compensation
from an insurance fund created during the litigation.62 Throughout the litigation,
the judge would "assume[] an aggressive managerial role."63
Rosenberg's ideas set the tone for the handling of mass products tort claims
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The explosion of asbestos claims
necessitated that judges administer them in an aggregate, "public law" model.64
A decade later, Judge Jack B. Weinstein, probably the most experienced and
knowledgeable judge on the topic of mass products torts, wrote, "Mass tort cases
are akin to public litigations involving court-ordered restructuring of institutions

53.

See Rosenberg, supra note 46, at 856-57.

54. See id. at 856.
55. See id. at 884.
56. Id. at 859.
57.

See id. at 907; Chayes, supra note 22, at 1302.

58. See Rosenberg, supra note 46, at 905.
59. See id. at 908-16.
60. Id. at 917.
61. See generally 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LAW § 1.03[5]-[6] (rev. ed. 2010) (explaining damage scheduling for the workers'
compensation system).
62. See Rosenberg, supra note 46, at 921.
63. Id. at 906.
64. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 650-52 (E.D. Tex. 1990) ("The
great challenge presented to the [c]ourt by this litigation is to provide a fair and cost effective means
of trying large numbers of asbestos cases."). But see Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821
(1999) ("[Asbestos litigation] defies customary judicial administration and calls for national

legislation.").
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to protect constitutional rights. In dealing with such mass tort cases as Agent
Orange, asbestos, and DES, I have sensed an atmosphere similar to that of public
interest cases I have supervised," including cases involving school
desegregation, prison reform, and reform of government institutions serving the
needs of the developmentally disabled. 65 At the same time, courts other than that
of Judge Weinstein have rejected many of Rosenberg's specific proposals,
sometimes on constitutional grounds. 66
Linda Mullenix has criticized Rosenberg, Weinstein, and others who have
attempted to fit the mass products tort litigation of the 1980s and early 1990s
into the mold of Chayes's public law model. 67 Looking only at the mass tort
68
ligation that predated the states' tobacco litigation, in most respects Mullenix
appears to have the better side of the argument. She acknowledges that many
aspects of mass tort cases do resemble the public law model described by
Chayes-"sprawling and amorphous litigation, subject to change over the course
of the litigation, and suffused with negotiating and mediating processes at every
point." 6 9 At the same time, she notes a number of important differences between
the mass tort litigation typical in the 1980s and 1990s and the type of public law
litigation described by Chayes. 70 Mullenix first distinguishes the "traditional"
mass products torts of that earlier era from the public law model by notin that
"mass tort cases typically involve private parties alleging private harms," 7 not,
as Chayes described, the substance of public law adjudication, "a grievance
about the operation of public policy." 7 2 Mullenix notes that "very little mass tort
litigation is directly invested with a public purpose." 73 Several other factors that
Mullenix describes suggest that earlier rounds of mass tort litigation do not fit

65. Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 469,
472-74 (1994).
66. See, e.g., Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821-30 (striking, on due process grounds, a settlement
agreement between plaintiffs and defendants that enabled asbestos claimants, both with pending
claims and with future claims, to recover from a trust funded largely with insurance proceeds, but
which severely limited the claimants' right to sue in court); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591, 597 (1997) (affirming denial of class action certification under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 for a "settlement only" class consisting of all individuals exposed to defendants'
asbestos products regardless of whether they currently displayed symptoms of any asbestos-related
disease); Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 317-20 (5th Cir. 1998) (overturning, on
due process grounds, the attempts of Judge Robert M. Parker to combine the class action vehicle
with statistical sampling to eliminate any requirement of individual causation).
67.

See Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Litigation: ParadigmMisplaced, 88

Nw. U. L. REv. 579, 580-82 (1994) [hereinafter Mullenix, Paradigm Misplaced]; Linda S.
Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law Dispute Resolution

Paradigm,33 VAL. U. L. REv. 413, 421-31 (1999) [hereinafter Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation].
68.

See Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation,supra note 67, at 425.

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 424 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 424-31.
Id. at 426.
Chayes, supra note 22, at 1302.

73.

Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation,supranote 67, at 426.
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within the public law model? 4 For example, she writes that "mass tort litigation
typically does not involve ongoing supervision by the courts or the presiding
judge once a mass tort has been settled or otherwise resolved."7
She also
reasons that while "mass tort litigation (with a few exceptions) typically is
litigation seeking compensatory and exemplary damages, ... [t]he classic public
law litigation, in contrast, was quintessentially equitable in nature, seeking
primarily injunctive or declaratory relief or other non-compensatory remediation
such as a consent decree."76
III. THE EMERGENCE OF MACRO-REGULATORY TORT LITIGATION

When state governments filed tort actions against the tobacco manufacturers
in the mid-i 990s, a new variant of mass torts emerged that was far different from
its immediate predecessors. The earlier mass products tort actions often were
collective in nature77 but remained focused almost entirely on compensation for
the victims of product-caused diseases. Beginning in 1995, governments and
class action representatives sued the manufacturers of cigarettes, handguns,79
and lead pigment,80 and eventually corporations emitting greenhouse gases.81
During these successive but overlapping litigation cycles, the goal of imposing
judicial regulation on the targeted industries grew in importance relative to
compensatory goals. These new cycles of litigation increasingly resembled the
traditional models of public interest litigation that relied on constitutional and
federal statutory provisions to reform organizational behavior.
A.

State Government Tobacco Litigation

In the mid-1990s, more than forty states filed tort actions against tobacco
manufacturers .82 Certainly one objective of the litigation was for the states to be
reimbursed for the Medicaid funds that they already had spent addressing
tobacco-related diseases, 8 3 but many of the litigants had an additional goal.
Graham E. Kelder, Jr. and Richard A. Daynard argued that "the failure of

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 427-31.
Id. at 429.
Id.
See Donald G. Gifford, The Challenge to the Individual CausationRequirement in Mass

ProductsTorts, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 873, 892-900 (2005).
78.
79.
80.

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part 1IIB.
See infra Part III.C.

81. See infra Part III.D.
82. Copies of the complaints filed by the states are available at the Galen Digital Library,
University of California, San Francisco.

See State Lawsuit Summary Chart, UCSF LIBRARY,

http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/1itigation/states (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
83.

Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation:A Tentative HistoryAssessment, 51 DEPAUL L.

REv. 331, 331 (2001).
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conventional forms of legislative and administrative regulation of tobacco
products and the recent shift in the landscape of tobacco litigation indicate[d]
that tobacco product liability litigation provide[d one of the most promising
means of controlling the sale and use of tobacco." 8 Daynard, a professor of law
and an early proponent of state litigation against tobacco manufacturers,
influenced Mississippi attorney general Michael Moore's decision to file the first
state lawsuit against the tobacco companies.
The tobacco companies and the states settled in 199886 and, in the process,
imposed a blueprint for tobacco regulation that would govern the industry for
more than a decade.87 Perhaps the most publicized aspect of the settlement was
the tobacco companies' agreement to pay the states more than $206 billion over
a period of twenty years. However, the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA)
also provided significant regulation of the tobacco companies' advertising and
other promotional activities.
The MSA prohibited using cartoon characters,
such as Joe Camel, in advertising. 90 The signatory companies agreed to forego
brand name advertising at events targeted to youth, including most concerts and
specified athletic events. 91 The MSA banned outdoor and transit advertising, 92
apparel advertising tobacco products,93 and distribution of free samples in
locations accessible to youth.94 In short, the MSA established the type of
regulatory regime that one would have expected Congress or federal
administrative agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission or the Federal
Communications Commission, to enact.
B. Municipal LitigationAgainst Handgun Manufacturers

Many of the same mass plaintiffs' attorneys who sued the tobacco
companies next focused their attention on the epidemic of inner-city violence,

84. Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the Effective
Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y. REV. 63, 63-64 (1997).
85. See Frank J. Vandall, The Legal Theory and the Visionaries That Led to the Proposed
$368.5 Billion Tobacco Settlement, 27 Sw. U. L. REv. 473, 478-80 (1998).
86. See MSA, supra note 23.
87. See id. at 18-36. Effectively, the MSA provided a comprehensive national blueprint that
provided the bulk of industry regulation until 2009 when Congress enacted the Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
88. MSA, supra note 23, at 54-83; see also Alison Frankel, After the Smoke Cleared: The
Inside Story of the Big Tobacco $206 Billion Settlement, AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 48
(reflecting on the states' settlement with the tobacco companies); Milo Geyelin, Forty-Six States
Agree to Accept $206 Billion Tobacco Settlement, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1998, at B13
(summarizing the MSA).
89. MSA, supra note 23, at 18-26.
90. See id. at 19.
91. Id. at 18-19.
92. Id. at 22-24.
93. Id. at 2 5.
94. Id. at 26.
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which they alleged resulted from the ready availability of handguns. 95 More
than a dozen municipalities joined with these attorneys to sue the manufacturers
and distributors of handguns.96 The National Rifle Association (NRA), a
powerful lobbying organization, had blocked effective regulatory legislation for
97
But as one plaintiffs' attorney commented, "You don't need a
years.
legislative majority to file a lawsuit." 98 Another, Wendell Gauthier, described
the plaintiffs' bar as "a de facto fourth branch of government." 99
The regulatory focus of the gun litigation was both more transparent and
more far-reaching than that of the tobacco litigation. The lawsuits filed by
municipalities and other collective entities, such as nonprofit organizations,
asked for significant injunctive relief as well as damages.100 The plaintiffs
requested "injunctive relief requiring the [f]irearms [s]uppliers to take assorted
measures that would effectively inhibit the flow of firearms into illegal
markets."10 1 Only a single gun manufacturer, Smith & Wesson, settled. 102It
agreed to restrict the manner in which it distributed guns, to provide each new
handgun with a trigger lock, and to develop "smart-gun technology." 103
Congress eventually ended tort-based regulatory litigation against gn
manufacturers by passing the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act.

95.

See Douglas McCollam, Long Shot, AM. LAW., June 1999, at 86, 86.

96. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A., Corp., 872 A.2d 633, 638-39 (D.C.
2005) (en banc) (bringing public nuisance, negligent firearm distribution, and statutory health care
reimbursement claims); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1105-06 (Ill.
2004) (seeking to recover law enforcement and medical expenses associated with illegal gun
violence).
97. See Timothy D. Lytton, The NRA, the Brady Campaign, & the Politics of Gun Litigation,
in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS

TORTS 152, 155-60 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005).
98.

Walter K. Olson, Plaintiffs Lawyers Take Aim at Democracy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21,

2000, at A26 (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. McCollam, supra note 95, at 86.
100. See, e.g., District of Columbia, at 638-39 (seeking reimbursement for health care
expenses and other costs "paid by the District to or on behalf of victims of gun violence"); NAACP
v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 446 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (seeking injunctive relief under public
nuisance theory); NAACP v. A.A. Arms, Inc., No. 99 CV 3999(JBW), No. 99 CV 7037(JBW),
2003 WL 21242939, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2003) (same); City of Chicago, at 1105-06 (seeking a
permanent injunction to abate the public nuisance resulting from gun usage and damages for
emergency medical expenses, prosecution of gun control ordinances, law enforcement efforts, and
victim health care expenses).
101. City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 391 (2d Cir. 2008); see also
AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 524-26 (detailing the requested injunctive relief).
102. See James Dao, Under Legal Siege, Gun Maker Agrees to Accept Curbs, N.Y. TIMES,

Mar. 18, 2000, at Al.
103. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7903 (2006)).
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C. Rhode IslandLead PigmentLitigation

During the same period, the State of Rhode Islands05 and dozens of
municipalities and other localities 106 sued lead pigment manufacturers, seeking
abatement of the alleged public nuisance stemming from the presence of lead in
older paint covering the walls of houses and preschools throughout the state.
These efforts were an even more direct attempt to use courts to solve a massive
public health problem and to circumvent the inability or unwillingness of state
legislatures and public health officials to do so. The incidents of lead poisoning
in Rhode Island were twice the national rate. 10 7 A leading state housing official
admitted that the state had "one of the weakest laws in the country" to protect
children from lead poisoning. os The state's environmental risk assessor
concluded, "We were sinking like the Titanic."109
The state's complaint against the lead pigment manufacturers asked for a
"judgment ordering the [d]efendants to detect and abate [1]ead in all residences,
schools, hospitals, and public and private buildings within the [s]tate accessible
to children."110 In February 2006, after nearly seven years of proceedings in the
trial court and after eight days of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict in favor
of the state, holding three of the four defendant pigment manufacturers liable for
the costs of abating the public nuisance caused by lead in buildings throughout
the state. 11 Following the jury verdict, the trial court judge asked the state
attorney general to provide a plan for remediating the conditions causing
childhood lead poisoning throughout the state.1 1 2 He indicated that his ultimate
remedial decree would likely track the attorney general's proposal.1 13 The 128-

105. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 434 (R.I. 2008).
106. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112, 114 (3d Cir. 1993)
(seeking recovery for expenses incurred from lead-based paint removal); Cnty. of Santa Clara v.
Superior Court, 235 P.3d 21, 25 (Cal. 2010) ("A group of public entities composed of various
California counties and cities . . . are prosecuting a public-nuisance action against numerous
businesses that manufactured lead paint . . . ."); City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226
S.W.3d 110, 112-13 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) (per curiam) (seeking to recover costs from city's lead
paint abatement program).
107. David A. Herzog, In War on Lead Poisoning,R.I. Is Inadequately Armed, PROVIDENCE

J., Feb. 21, 1999, at 1.
108. Peter B. Lord, Another Generation Caught in a Sad Cycle-Public Health CrisisPoisoned,PROVIDENCE J., May 13, 2001, at El.

109. Herzog, supra note 107, at A17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Complaint, State ex rel. Whitehouse v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226 (R.I. Super. Ct.
Oct. 12, 1999), available at http://www.riag.ri.gov/documents/reports/lead/lead complaint.pdf.
111. See Peter B. Lord, 3 CompaniesFound Liable in Lead-PaintNuisance Suit, PROVIDENCE
J., Feb. 23, 2006, at Al.
112. State ex rel. Lynch v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. PC 99-5226, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32, at
*307 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2007).
113. Id.
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page plan that the attorney general submitted 114 was never implemented because
the Rhode Island Supreme Court soon reversed the judgment against the
defendants.115
The attorney general's proposal called for remediation of lead in
approximately 240,000 Rhode Island residences and 758 schools and child care
centers,116 at an estimated total cost to the defendants of more than $2.4
billion.117 The plan anticipated that ten thousand trained and skilled workers
would spend four years working under the court's supervision to abate the
nuisance. 18 The plan was extremely detailed. For example, it required that
when workers replaced windows to avoid the lead dust created when old
windows were raised or lowered, "Energy Star label" windows should be
installed, 119 presumably responding to the legitimate public objective of saving
energy, but unrelated to lead hazard abatement.
If the Rhode Island Supreme Court had not reversed the jury verdict, and the
trial court judge had followed his plan of closely hewing to the attorney
general's proposal, the judge would have supervised the largest public works
project in Rhode Island history and the largest lead remediation program in
history. It is likely, of course, that the court would have needed to address, on an
ongoing basis, defendant manufacturers' objections regarding the costs of the
remediation effort and even concerns of homeowners and renters unhappy about
being forced from their homes during lead remediation. No court, even in cases
of constitutionally mandated school desegregation or prison reform, has tackled
a project of this scope and complexity. The only authority justifying this
massive judicial enterprise was a questionable judicial interpretation of the
boundaries of the most indeterminate of all torts, public nuisance.12 0
D. Climate Change Litigation
The use of common law tort actions to implement regulatory regimes when
the political branches had stalemated reached unprecedented heights when
states,121 municipalities, 122 and class action representatives 123 filed tort actions

114. See R.I. DEP'T ATT'Y GEN., RHODE ISLAND LEAD NUISANCE ABATEMENT PLAN (Sept.

14, 2007) [hereinafter ABATEMENT PLAN], available at http://www.riag.ri.gov/documents/RILead
NuisanceAbatementPlan9-14-07.pdf.
115. State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 435 (R.I. 2008).
116. ABATEMENT PLAN, supra note 114, at 8.

117. Id. at 122.
118. Id. at 107.
119. Id. at 15.
120. See Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass ProductTort, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 741,
774-90 (discussing public nuisance as an "ill-defined tort").
121. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 316 (2d Cir. 2009)
(reporting lawsuit filings by eight states for the abatement of the defendants' contributions to global
warming); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (discussing California's claim for damages against car manufacturers for
contributing to global warming). In Californiav. General Motors Corp., California voluntarily
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seeking to impose more stringent emission standards on those who emit
greenhouse gases contributing to global climate change. At the time of the filing
of these lawsuits, the EPA argued that it lacked statutory authority to regulate
greenhouse gases, 124 a position later repudiated by the Supreme Court in
Massachusetts v. EPA. 125
In Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.,126 eight states, the City of

New York, and three land trusts sued six electric utility companies, seeking
abatement of emissions from the defendants' fossil fuel-powered plants that
allegedly contributed to global warming.127 At least one of the state attorneys
general who filed the complaint acknowledged that the legal action sought to
create a regulatory regime when the EPA had failed to do so.128 The complaint
asked the court to issue an injunction requiring each defendant "to cap its carbon
dioxide emissions and then reduce them by a specified percentage each year for
at least a decade." 129 Peter Lehner, a New York assistant attorney general who
played a critical role in the litigation,130 later wrote of his frustration when the
EPA failed to regulate greenhouse gas emissions: "We are fortunate that we live
in a country with three branches of government-and two levels of
sovereignty-so that the unfortunate inaction of one branch does not leave our
citizens without hope or recourse."13 1
The federal district court dismissed the complaint in American Electric
Power Co., holding that it presented a nonjusticiable political question.132
However, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the complaint did not pose a

dismissed its appeal of the district court's decision because the EPA had acknowledged that
greenhouse gases endangered public health and safety and President Obama had instructed the
Department of Transportation to increase vehicle fuel efficiency standards. Unopposed Motion to
Dismiss Appeal at 3-4, Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871 (No. 07-16908). The fact that
General Motors Corporation and Chrysler had both filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy also influenced
California's decision to voluntarily dismiss the appeal. Id. at 4.
122. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 316 (noting New York City as plaintiff);
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (noting
an Eskimo village as plaintiff).
123. See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009) (discussing
allegations of class that defendants' conduct contributed to severity of Hurricane Katrina).
124. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 511-12 (2007) (citing Control of Emissions
from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,925-31 (Sept. 8, 2003)).
125. Id. at 528.
126. 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), petitionfor cert.filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3085, 3114 (U.S. Aug.
2, 2010) (No. 10-174).
127. Id. at 314.
128. See Peter Lehner, Connecticut v. AEP: A Long History of Nuisance Law, 35 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1, 1-2 (2010).

129. Complaint at 49, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (No. 1:04-cv-05669-LAP), 2004 WL 5614397.
130. See Lehner, supra note 128, at 1.
131. Id. at 7.
132. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274.
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political question. 133 The court also held that the plaintiffs had standing to raise
their claims 134 and that they had properly stated a claim under the law of public
nuisance.
Judge Peter Hall, who wrote the Second Circuit opinion,13 later
acknowledged that the panel was motivated by the failure of both the EPA to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions and Congress to pass comprehensive climate
change legislation.
Judge Hall suggested that climate change litigation
"provide[s] a backstop and 'some small impetus' to stonewalling lawmakers." 138
Similar to the regulatory purpose behind American Electric Power Co.,

California's climate change litigation against the domestic auto manufacturers
sought stronger environmental regulation.139 Daniel A. Farber noted that the
litigation was a "part of an effort to push the federal government into acting" in
the face of a federal vacuum. 14 0 The two other major pieces of climate change
litigation, seeking damages instead of injunctive relief, 41 on their face are less
openly aimed at reforming the regulation of greenhouse gases. However,
informed observers and the parties themselves acknowledge that the underlying
objective is to regulate ireenhouse gas emissions despite the nature of the
specific relief requested.
James E. Tierney, director of the National State
Attorneys General program at Columbia Law School, acknowledged that this
genre of litigation is "'a hammer' that could drive industries to the negotiating
table." 143 Carol Browner, former Director of the White House Office of Energy
and Climate Change Policy,144 commented that "the courts are starting to take
control of this issue" even though "setting environmental standards is best done
through legislation." 45

133. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 332 (2d. Cir. 2009).
134. Id. at 349.
135. Id. at 371.
136. Id. at 314.
137. Doug Kendall & Hannah McCrea, Attractive Nuisance: Can FederalCourts Help Tackle
Global Warming?, SLATE (Apr. 20, 2010, 9:42 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2251123/.
138. Id.
139. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *1-2 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
140. Cymie R. Payne, Climate Change:Law and Policy-StateInitiatives, ACADEMIC EARTH
(Jan. 27, 2009), http://academicearth.org/lectures/state-initiatives (presenting law school lecture by
Farber).
141. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859-60 (5th Cir. 2009); Native Vill. of
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868-69 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
142. Complaint at 1-2, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (No. 1:04-cv-05669-LAP), 2004 WL 5614397; John Schwartz, Courts Emerging as
Battlefieldfor Fights over Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, at Al.
143. Schwartz, supra note 142, at A4.
144. Obama Advisor Carol Browner Leaving, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2011, http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/201 1/jan/25/obaia-adviser-carol-browner-leaving/.
145. Schwartz, supra note 142, at A4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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E. The Public Law Model and the New Genre of Public Policy-Making
Tort Litigation

Both liberal and conservative judges and tort scholars acknowledge that one
of the legitimate objectives of tort law is to regulate the conduct of potential
tortfeasors in order to minimize the costs of accidental harm. 146 But typically,
the deterrent or loss-minimization impact of tort law occurs as a result of the
drip-by-drip accumulation of judgments in individual lawsuits sending a
147
The newer phenomenon, public
regulatory signal to potential tortfeasors.
interest tort litigation, seeks to impose an explicitly regulatory regime to prevent
a more widespread, less circumscribed or localized, harm.
I define public interest tort litigation as any tort litigation possessing all of
the following characteristics:
1. Public interest tort litigation seeks to tackle large social problems
instead of seeking to resolve disputes between individual parties (or
involving carefully defined and circumscribed groups of plaintiffs or
defendants, or both). In this manner, it is similar to any other public
interest litigation, but unlike most tort litigation.
2. Public interest tort litigation is a collective action, most often filed
on behalf of a collective plaintiff seeking to address harms sustained in
the first instance by thousands or millions of individuals. Collective
actions may be filed by states as parens patriae, municipal
governments, or class action representatives. The substantive claimmost often public nuisance-conceives of the harm as a collective harm.
3. Unlike earlier genres of public interest litigation, this new form of
litigation purports to derive its authority not from the Constitution or
federal statutes, but from judge-made or common law, most often from
the most vaguely defined tort, public nuisance.
4. The objective of public interest tort litigation is either to circumvent
the regulatory structures already established by the political branches or
to impose new regulation where legislative efforts have stalled or
otherwise failed.

146. See, e.g., GuiDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONoMIC
ANALYSIS 68 (1970) (discussing various methods of reducing accident costs); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 167- 69 (7th ed. 2007) (using the "Hand Formula" to weigh costs of
accidents and behavior modification).
147. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297-98 (7th Cir. 1995). In In re
Rhone-Poulenc, Judge Posner contrasts the "sheer magnitude" of liability facing defendants
confronted by class action litigation with that to which they are exposed by a series of individual
actions. Id.
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The first three of these four defining characteristics were present in the
tobacco litigation and in each of the litigation cycles that followed. The fourth
characteristic, perhaps the key defining feature of this new genre of litigation,
was present in the tobacco litigation only in a nascent form, but was readily
apparent in the handgun, lead pigment, and climate change litigation. On one
hand, a new regulatory regime for regulating tobacco products did emerge from
the settlement of the litigation, and more stringent regulation of the industry was
a goal shared by many who sponsored the litigation.148 On the other hand, the
states' primary goal in filing the litigation was probably to be reimbursed for the
costs they incurred as a result of tobacco-related illnesses. Also, the new
regulatory regime only emerged during the settlement negotiations and was not
relief requested in the litigation itself.
As described earlier, Linda Mullenix wrote during the time when the states'
tobacco litigation was pending and when mass products torts did not fit within
the boundaries of Chayes's public law model. 14 Her reasoning was convincing
as it applied to mass tort actions that had been litigated at the time she wrote.
Asbestos actions and the other traditional mass products tort actions prevalent at
that time did not meet the definitional criteria of the public law model. But
Mullenix's reasoning did not-and could not have at the time she wrotedistinguish between traditional mass tort litigation and the new genre of public
policy-making tort litigation that I have described. For our purposes, perhaps the
most important factor that Mullenix identified for differentiating litigation under
Chayes's public law model from earlier mass tort litigation was that mass tort
litigation neither possesses "a public purpose" nor seeks reform of public
institutions.So Even when she wrote in 1999, however, Mullenix was careful to
exclude the then-recent tobacco litigation from this analysis. As previously
discussed, the tobacco, handgun, lead pigment, and climate change litigation
sought to effect government policy. 151 As such, these forms of litigation fall
within the new public policy-making tort litigation.
Several other factors that Mullenix describes, while helping to exclude
earlier mass tort litigation from the public law model, suggest that the latest
genre of policy-making tort litigation fits comfortably within it. Mullenix noted
that mass tort litigation usually "does not involve ongoing supervision by the
courts." 152 Obviously, Associate Justice Michael A. Silverstein of the Rhode
Island Superior Court would have continually been involved in supervising the
remediation of lead paint hazards in Rhode Island if the state supreme court had
not reversed his order to the defendants to abate the public nuisance. 153

148. See supra Part III.A.
149. See supranotes 67-76 and accompanying text.
150. See Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation, supranote 67, at 426.

151. See supraPart III.A-D.
152. Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation, supra note 67, at 429.

153. See State ex rel. Lynch v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, C.A. No. PC 99-5226, 2007 R.I. Super.
LEXIS 32 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2007) (holding that a special master should be appointed to
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Similarly, if, on remand, the district court finds a public nuisance in American
Electric Power Co. and orders injunctive relief against the operators of the
electric utility power-generating plants, 15 4 the nature and duration of the trial
court judge's responsibility will far more closely resemble those of a trial judge
in a school desegregation or prison reform case rather than those of a judge in
asbestos litigation.
Mullenix also contrasted mass products torts, where the primary objective
consists of damages, with the public law model, where the plaintiffs usually
request an injunction, some other form of equitable relief, or a consent decree.
Again, the tobacco, handgun, lead pigment, and climate change litigation all
clearly belong on the "public law" side of the ledger under this criterion.
Finally, Mullenix noted that "mass tort cases typically involve private parties
alleging private harms."157 Of course, in public policy-making tort litigation, the
tobacco plaintiffs were state governments, the handgun plaintiffs were most
often municipal governments, and the lead pigment plaintiffs were either state or
local governments. In climate change litigation, some of the plaintiffs are
governments or quasi-governmental units and some are class representatives.
Most public interest tort claims rely on public nuisance, which essentially alleges
a public harm, not a private one.
One of Chayes's own criteria defining the public law model was that "[t]he
remedy is not imposed but negotiated."9 The parties in the states' tobacco
litigation obviously negotiated the remedy.160 It is likely that any remedy in the
other litigation cycles against the manufacturers of handguns and lead would
have been entirely negotiated between the parties or at least that any courtimposed decree would have reflected specific terms that the parties agreed to.
Chayes also described the remedy in public law litigation as "forward looking,
fashioned ad hoc on flexible and broadly remedial lines, often having important
consequences for many persons including absentees." 16 1 The Rhode Island
attorney general's proposed plan for the abatement of lead-based paint hazards in
more than 240,000 private residences specified in some detail how the state

advise the court in considering a remedial order), rev'd sub nom. State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951
A.2d 428 (R.I. 2008).
154. See text accompanying notes 151-92.
155. Compare FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 29, at 27-143, 362-80 (analyzing the judicial role
in prison reform), Fair, supra note 29, at 149-58 (concluding that courts have the capacity to
implement prison reform), and Kurland, supra note 28, at 322 (discussing the role of federal district
court judges in desegregating schools), with Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649,
650-51 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (discussing the logistics of adjudicating thousands of potential asbestos
claims).
156. Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation, supra note 67, at 427-28.
157. Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation, supra note 67, at 426.
158. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979); Gifford, supra note 120, at 814-

19.
159. Chayes, supra note 22, at 1302.
160. See MSA, supra note 23.
161. Chayes, supra note 22, at 1302.
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would conduct this massive project.162 It was forward-looking and concretely
affected the property owners' rights and obligations.163 Moreover, it affected
those residing in the affected residences whom the abatement would remove
from their homes for periods of a few hours to ten days or more, depending on
the risk level.164 Any remedy in the climate change litigation would be forwardlooking, determining by what percentage each defendant would be forced to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Additionally, if the factual allegations of the
plaintiffs in American Electric Power Co.
and the other climate change
complaintsl66 are correct, the court's remedy would have important
consequences for all 6.9 billion of us! To determine whether a public nuisance
exists in these cases and what the remedy should be, the courts' "fact inquir[ies]
[will be] not historical and adjudicative but predictive and legislative"-another
indication, according to Chayes, of public law adjudication.16 In short, the new
policy-driven public interest tort actions are decidedly different from the mass
tort actions of the 1980s. As such, they fit within Chayes's public law model.
IV. PUBLIC INTEREST TORT LITIGATION AND THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION

I now turn to the question posed in the introduction: Within our
constitutional framework, and consistent with separation of powers and the

162. See ABATEMENT PLAN, supra note 114.

163. Id.
164. Id. at 100.
165. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 316-19 (2d Cir. 2009) ("Plaintiffs
claim that global warming, to which [the d]efendants contribute as the 'five largest emitters of
carbon dioxide in the United States and ... among the largest in the world,' by emitting 650 million
tons per year of carbon dioxide, is causing and will continue to cause serious harms affecting human
health and natural resources." (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Connecticut v. Am.
Elec. Power Co., 406 F.Supp.2d 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2005))).
166. See, e.g., Complaint for Damages at 44-46, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil
Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 865 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 4-08-CV-01 138-SBA) ("Defendants contribute to
global warming through their emissions of large quantities of greenhouse gases. Defendants in this
action include many of the largest emitters of greenhouse gases in the United States. All
Defendants directly emit large quantities of greenhouse gases and have done so for many years.
Defendants are responsible for a substantial portion of the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that
have caused global warming and Kivalina's special injuries."); Complaint for Damages &
Declaratory Judgment at 9-12, California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 06CV05755 MJJ, 2006 WL
2726547, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) ("Defendants, by their annual emissions in the United
States of approximately 289 million metric tons of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, are
substantial contributors-among the world's largest contributors-to global warming, and to the
adverse impacts on California. Defendants' motor vehicle emissions in the United States account
for approximately nine percent of the world's carbon dioxide emissions and over thirty percent of
emissions from sources within the State of California."); Class Action Complaint for Damages &
Declaratory Relief at 11-12, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007
WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007) ("The Oil Company Defendant Class has engaged in
activities that have produced the greatest single source of by-products leading to the development
and increase of global warming.").
167. Chayes, supra note 22, at 1302.
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limits of the judicial function, may courts use the vague standards of tort law to
impose detailed regulations on a group of businesses allegedly contributing to a
problem that is literally worldwide in scope?
In his insightful essay The Limits of Law, Peter H. Schuck describes three
separate critiques of the "growing ambitions for law," 169 two of which are
relevant to answering this question. He identifies the "functionalist critique"-a
question of judicial competence,170 and the "illegitimacy critique," of which
separation of powers concerns is an important feature.171 In this Part, I focus
primarily on climate change litigation, the pinnacle of public interest tort
litigation, because it most starkly exposes these issues.
A.

The Limits of the JudicialFunction

Environmental scholar Richard J. Lazarus describes global climate change

as a "super wicked problem." 172 There is no direct and immediate feedback link
between reductions in greenhouse gas emissions at a specific location, or even
within a region, and changes in the climate of that geographical area.173 The
scope of the problem is worldwide. 174 The decision to regulate and reduce
emissions often will not have an impact for decades or even generations.
Climate change is caused not only by greenhouse gas emissions, but also by the
clearing of vast acreages of vegetation, such as dense tropical rainforests, that
otherwise would remove huge volumes of carbon dioxide, the most common
greenhouse gas, from the atmosphere. 176
The negative impact of greenhouse gases is diffused and generalized.17 In
these cases, there is no single harm,178 unlike that suffered by the typical tort
plaintiff, say the victim of an auto accident. Nor is the harm as circumscribed,
discrete, and localized as it has been in past nuisance claims that alleged air or
water pollution. 17 9 Further, when a court orders a domestic business to reduce or
eliminate emissions, the business either incurs new costs or decides to reduce or

168. PETER H. SHUCK, The Limits ofLaw, in THE LIMITS OF LAW: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE 419 (2000).
169. Id. at 424-34.

170. Id. at 427-32.
171. Id. at 432-34.
172. Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the

Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1153, 1160 (2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
173. See id. at 1163-64.
174. Id. at 1163, 1168-73.
175. See id. at 1167.
176. Id. at 1161-63.
177. See id. at 1163-64.
178. See id.
179. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236, 239 (1907) (enjoining a
Tennessee factory from emitting pollution into Georgia's air); Missouri v. Illinois (Missourill), 200

U.S. 496, 526 (1906) (declining to enjoin Illinois from dumping sewage into the Mississippi River).
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eliminate its greenhouse gas-emitting activity.1so Achieving the optimal mixture
of regulation across all greenhouse gas emitters and industries requires weighin
the relative societal costs and benefits of reducing emissions from each.18
Ultimately, this comparative weighing process needs to be international in scope,
because the reduction of a given quanta of greenhouse gas emissions from China
or India has exactly the same impact on global climate change as a similar
reduction in any given industry in the United States. 182
These are not the kinds of decisions that a common law court, without
guidance from previously enacted statutory or regulatory standards, is capable of
making. No appropriate judicial standard exists enabling a court to decide
whether the contributions of any particular defendant emitter constitute the
"unreasonable interference" required by most definitions of public nuisance. 183
The judicial process is far different from that of the EPA or any other
administrative agency. As Justice Stevens concluded in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc.,184 "Judges are not experts in the field
". ... In contrast, wrote Justice Stevens, administrative agencies address
"technical and complex" matters "in a detailed and reasoned fashion" and their
decisions "reconcil[e] conflicting policies." 1 86
The current and anticipated problems that global climate change causes are
not "the kinds of disputes which lend themselves to reasoned decision," as Henry
M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks referred to cases appropriate for
adjudication.187 Because any group of defendants sued in any particular climate
change case contributes only a very small share of the greenhouse gases that mix
in the atmosphere and cause any plaintiff s harm, plaintiffs asking for relief from
specific harms, such as the melting of the California mountain snowpack, are
asking for a remedy not "within the power of the tribunal to grant." 189 More
importantly, solving global climate change falls within the category of what Hart
and Sacks referred to as a "managerial decision[]."l 90 Such decisions are not

180. See The Costs of Reducing Greenhouse-Gas Emissions, ECON. & BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF

(Cong. Budget Office, Wash., D.C.), Nov. 23, 2009, at 2, available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/
104xx/doclO458/11-23-GreenhouseGasEmissions Brief.pdf.
181. See id.

182. See Lazarus, supra note 172, at 1163-64 (describing how the concentration of
greenhouse gases is uniform around the world).
183. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 446-47 (R.I. 2008); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) of TORTS § 821B(1) (1979).
184. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN

THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 646 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,

1994).
188. See Complaint at 1-2, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 1=04-CV-05669-LAP).
189. HART & SACKS, supra note 187, at 646.

190. See id. at 647.
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usually suitable for adjudication, they explained, "because of the numerous
variables to be taken into account and the impossibility of developing generally
applicable premises of reasoning with reference to which the variables can be
judged." 91
James M. Landis, a leading administrative law scholar during the New Deal
and the decades that followed, concluded that the modem administrative
regulatory state "sprang from a distrust of the ability of the judicial process to
make the necessary adjustments in the development of both law and regulatory
methods as they related to particular industrial problems." 92 In contrast to
courts, the legitimacy of administrative agencies' actions within a constitutional
framework rests not on their reasoned elaboration, but rather on their
accountability to the political branches of the government.193 Justice Stevens
wrote that administrative agencies "properly rely upon the incumbent
administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments" and that "it is
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the [g]overnment to make such
policy choices." 1 94 Cass R. Sunstein, currently serving as Adminstrator of the
White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 195 described how the
politically accountable branches of government, including both the President and
Congress, increasingly exercise tighter control over administrative agencies.196
In contrast, federal courts are not politically accountable.197 State judges often
are elected, 198 but it clearly would be improper for a candidate running for
judicial office to make a campaign promise to reduce global warming.199
1. JudiciallyDiscoverable and ManageableStandards
The first requirement of judicial competence to adjudicate an issue before
the court is the ability to discern 'judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it." 200 The issue is not whether the court can employ a
special master to weigh the costs and benefits of the defendants' activities as an
administrative agency would. Rather the question is whether 'judicial"

191. Id.
192. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 30 (1938).

193. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
194. Id. at 865.
195. About 0IRA, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforegadministrator
(last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
196. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REv. 421, 45263, 478-83 (1987).
197. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (stating that federal judges have automatic lifetime tenure
and non-diminishing compensation).
198. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE

COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE 21 n.3 (7th ed. 1998).

199. See HART & SACKS, supra note 187, at 643 ("[T]he popular election ofjudges does not
in actual practice mean political accountability for particular decisions, nor is it ordinarily so
understood.").
200. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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standards exist to guide the determination of whether a defendant's specific
contributions to worldwide carbon emissions were "unreasonable."
In American Electric Power Co.,201 the Second Circuit reasoned that
standards did exist to determine whether the utility companies' carbon emissions
constituted a nuisance, because "federal courts have successfully adjudicated
complex common law public nuisance cases for over a century."
The court
referenced the definition of public nuisance contained in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts-"an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public."203 It also noted that the federal courts had competently handled
trans-state boundary air and water pollution cases since at least the early decades
of the twentieth century.2 04
205

But in Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,

a California

federal district court convincingly reasoned that the issue of whether judicially
discoverable and manageable standards exist is not an issue of whether the
problems are complex, but rather whether there are "legal tools" available "to
reach a ruling that is 'principled, rational, and based upon reasoned
distinctions."' 206 The court rejected the argument accepted by the court in
American Electric Power Co. that the standard of "unreasonableness" found in
the definition of public nuisance in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and

previous interpretations of the meaning of public nuisance from the United
States Supreme Court,207 provide judicially discoverable and manageable

201. 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted,79 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010) (No.
10-174).

202. Id. at 326-30.
203. Id. at 328 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Restatement lists three "circumstances" that help a court determine
whether the interference is "unreasonable." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2) (1979).
These circumstances include whether the interference with a public right is (1) significant, (2)
proscribed by statute or regulation, and (3) continuing in nature. Id.
204. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 326-27 (citing Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S.
230, 236, 239 (1907) (granting Georgia's request to enjoin a Tennessee factory from emitting large
amounts of pollution into Georgia's air); Missouri v. Illinois (Missourill), 200 U.S. 496, 517, 526
(1906) (dismissing Missouri's request to enjoin Illinois from dumping sewage into the Mississippi
River because of inadequate evidence that bacteria from the sewage caused typhoid)).
205. 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
206. Id. at 874 (quoting Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 552 (9th Cir. 2005)).
207. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 106-08 (1972) (holding that water
pollution may create a public nuisance); New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473, 482-83
(1931) (holding that dumping garbage in the ocean may create a public nuisance upon citizens and
property owners); Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 238-39 (holding that defendant's emission of
sulfur dioxide into the air traveling over plaintiffs land sufficiently threatened harm to permit an
injunction preventing the nuisance); MissouriII, 200 U.S at 518 ("The nuisance ... was one which
would be of international importance-a visible change of a great river from a pure stream into a
polluted and poisoned ditch.").
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standards.208 Instead, it found that the nuisance claims in past precedents
209 were
"far different" from those alleged in the global climate change litigation.
2.

The PolycentricNature of Climate Change Litigation

Overlapping with the absence of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards is the fact that the judicial process is ill-suited to adjudicate polycentric
claims with as many interrelated factors as those posed by the climate chanfe
litigation.

In his classic article, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,

published after his death,211 Lon L. Fuller concludes that polycentric issues are
inherently unsuitable for adjudication.2 12 As an example, Fuller suggests that it
would be impossible for courts "to have all wages and prices set by . . .
adjudication" because "the forms of adjudication cannot encompass and take into
account the complex repercussions that may result from any change in prices or
wages."213 Fuller compared polycentric issues to "a spider web" in which "[a]
pull on one strand will distribute tensions [along] a complicated pattern
throughout the web as a whole."2 14 Yet even the complexity of wage and price
controls pales in comparison with the polycentric nature of climate change
reform, with its multiple interactions within the ecological web, interlaced with
worldwide economic repercussions.
James Henderson, applying Fuller's
insights to design defect product liability cases-an example posing far less
challenging issues than those inherent in global climate change-argued that it is
managers," nota courts, who should decide such matters. 215 The manager,
Henderson contended, "is not bound to apply any law in reaching a decision and,
in fact, is free to make judgments through the exercise of his unfettered
discretion." 216
It is difficult to imagine a more polycentric set of issues than that presented
in the climate change litigation. Consider the intertwining issues that Richard
Lazarus identified and that were discussed earlier.217 Similarly, in rejecting the
parallel between prior public nuisance cases and the climate change litigation
before it, the Kivalina court stated, "While a water pollution claim typically
involves a discrete, geographically definable waterway, [the p]laintiffs' global
warming claim is based on the emission of greenhouse gases from innumerable
sources located throughout the world and affecting the entire planet and its

208. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 874-76.
209. Id. at 875.
210. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353 (1978).

211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
See id. at 393-404.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 395.

215. James A. Henderson, Jr., JudicialReview ofManufacturers' Conscious Design Choices:
The Limits ofAdjudication, 73 COLuM. L. REv. 1531, 1538-39 (1973).
216. Id. at 1538.

217. See supranotes 172-76 and accompanying text.
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atmosphere."2 18 Stronger carbon emissions standards imposed on United States
industrial producers of widgets would probably lead those producers either to
cease production or to raise the costs of domestic widgets. Either event might
lead a competing South Korean widget producer to increase production.
Assuming, hypothetically, that South Korean producers emit a greater quantum
of greenhouse gases per widget than do American manufacturers, the net
contribution to global climate change would be greater, not less, than if the court
had declined to act. The separate issues of (1) how the level of greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere is determined and (2) the impact of mandated reductions on
the world's economy are each individually enormously polycentric. When
intertwined, the issues are even more web-like and polycentric. As Henderson
notes, "The more polycentric the problem, the less equipped ... the courts [are]
to deal with it."219
3.

JudicialCompetence and Public Interest Torts

It is unlikely that a court has ever encountered a problem as polycentric as
global climate change and with a judicial standard as amorphous as the
"unreasonable interference" standard at the heart of liability under public
nuisance law.220 Schuck concluded that the judicial competence of common law
tort judges could be "assumed" when "accidents were relatively straightforward
and no obvious alternative existed." 22 1 But he warned that "when judges came to
pursue broad policy goals through instrumental doctrines that treat litigants as
proxies for putative social interests, . . . they opened a Pandora's box." 222
Courts' inability to adjudicate whether specific defendants should be held
liable for the consequences of global climate change 223 highlights the lack of
judicial competence. But other public tort litigation poses similar problems. For
example, the State of Rhode Island claimed that the pigment manufacturers had
contributed to the creation of a public nuisance consisting of lead contained in
the paint applied to the walls of residences throughout the state. 224 Studies

218. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 875 (N.D. Cal.
2009). Furthermore, the court reasoned that tracing the causation between the defendant's acts and
the plaintiffs harm was far more difficult and convoluted in climate change litigation than in water
pollution cases that rest on federal statutory claims. Id. at 880.
219. Henderson, supra note 215, at 1539.
220. Some definitions of public nuisance are even more vague. For example, the Florida
Supreme Court has proclaimed that "a public nuisance may be classified as something that causes
'any annoyance to the community or harm to public health."' Flo-Sun, Inc. v. Kirk, 783 So. 2d
1029, 1036 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Kirk v. U.S. Sugar Corp., 726 So. 2d 822, 826 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999)).
221. SHUCK, supranote 168, at 431.
222. Id.
223. While plaintiffs have alleged that courts should hold specific defendants liable for the
consequences of global climate change, to date, there have been no cases holding a specific
defendant liable for its effects on global warming. See supra Part III.D.
224. State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 434, 437 (R.I. 2008).
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showed that property owners' neglect in maintaining surfaces covered with paint
containing lead dramatically increased the likelihood of childhood lead
poisoning.225 The pigment manufacturers filed a third-party complaint alleging
that property owners, instead of the manufacturers, should be forced to abate the
public nuisance and that, if the manufacturers were to be held liable, they should
be reimbursed, in whole or in part, by the property owners. 226 On one hand, the
addition of 300,000 third-party defendants to an already complex legal action
was clearly impossible.2 27 On the other hand, the court's ruling left unresolved
the legitimate question of whether property owners, at least those who failed to
maintain their properties and who thus contributed to childhood lead poisoning,
should bear some or all of the legal responsibility for the risks posed by leadbased paint hazards.228 In short, if it is difficult or impossible for a trial court to
consider the contributions of a significant number of property owners to
childhood lead poisoning, the courts lack the judicial competence to resolve the
issue of preventing childhood lead poisoning in the state. Yet this challenge
pales in comparison with those facing courts in climate change litigation.
Neither set of public health problems should be resolved in the courtroom.
B. SeparationofPowers

Another one of Schuck's criterion of judicial competence is "legitimacy," 229
which begins with the constitutional allocation of powers among the three
coordinate branches of government and includes other factors affecting public
respect for the law.230 As James A. Henderson, Jr. recently concluded, "[I]t is
commonly understood that, in a representative democracy, macro-economic
regulation is accomplished most appropriately by elected officials and their
lawful delegates." 2 31 The same certainly appears true of regulation designed to
prevent statewide public health problems and global environmental problems.
The concept of separation of powers within the federal system is derived
from the allocation of powers to the legislative, executive, and judicial branches
of government by the United States Constitution. 23 2 The Supreme Court has

225. See Christy Darlene Plumer, Setting Priorities for Prevention of Childhood Lead
Poisoning in the City of Providence (May 2000) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Brown University) (on
file with the Center for Environmental Studies, Brown University), available at
http://envstudies.brown.edu/theses/2000FinalPlumer.pdf.
226. Third Party Complaint at 3, Lead Indus. Ass', 951 A.2d 425 (No. 99-5226).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. SCHUCK, supra note 168, at 432-34.
230. Id.
231. James A. Henderson, Jr., The Lawlessness ofAggregative Torts, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV.
329, 338 (2005).
232. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (allocating all federal legislative powers to Congress); id art.
II, § 1 (allocating all executive power to the President); id. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial [p]ower
... shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish.").
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consistently recognized "the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution
that, within our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into
three coordinate [b]ranches is essential to the preservation of liberty."2 33 As part
of the separation of power concept, the authority of federal courts, derived from
Article III of the Constitution, is limited to "cases" and "controversies."234 This
limitation on judicial authority overlaps with the judicial competency concerns
previously considered.235 In Mistretta v. United States,236 the Supreme Court
stated that the business of federal courts is limited to questions presented in a
form "traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial
process."237 This constraint on courts is to ensure that they are neither "assigned
nor allowed 'tasks that are more properly accomplished by [other] branches."' 238
The requirements of justiciability follow from separation of powers concerns
"about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected,
unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government."23 The application of two
specific aspects of justiciability, standing and the political question doctrine, to
public interest tort litigation, particularly climate change litigation, will be
considered in Part VI.
Most state constitutions explicitly provide that separation of powers
principles apply to their state governments.240 Even in the absence of explicit
provisions, many scholars find separation of powers principles implicit within
the structure of state government.241 Additionally, Laurence Tribe argues that

233. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989); see also Clinton v. City of New
York, 524 U.S. 417, 451-52 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("When the legislative and executive
powers are united in the same person or body,

. .

. there can be no liberty . . . ." (quoting THE

FEDERALIST No. 47, at 338 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 272 (1991) ("The ultimate purpose of this separation of powers is to
protect the liberty and security of the governed.").
234. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
235. See supraPart IV.A.

236. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
237. Id. at 385 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
238. Id. at 383 (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 680-81 (1988)).
239. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d
1166, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring)).
240. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("The powers of the state government shall be divided
into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise
any powers appertaining to either of the other branches . . . ."); ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("The
legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly
belonging to another."); N.J. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The powers of the government shall be divided
among three distinct branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial. No . . . one branch shall
exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others. . .").
241. See JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF

FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 161 (2005) ("Every state constitution ...

creates a horizontal

separation of powers by dividing the power of state government among a legislative, executive, and
judicial branch."); Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist
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the language of the United States Constitution implies that separation of powers
principles pertain to the states.242
Even though the separation of powers principle typically applies to both the
federal and state governments, there are significant differences between how
state constitutions and the United States Constitution allocate powers among the
coordinate branches of government. Most important, unlike the limited
congressional powers enumerated in the United States Constitution, the powers
of state legislatures are plenary in the absence of constitutional provisions that
either limit legislative powers or grant powers to the executive or judicial
branch.243
Climate change and the other public health problems prompting public
interest tort actions are the society-wide harms our constitutional structures
suggest the political branches should handle. Public interest tort law requires a
policy decision more of the type appropriate for political institutions deriving
their legitimacy from political accountability-not a court's reasoned elaboration
from precedents most often bearing little or no resemblance to the large-scale
244
problems at hand. Legislatures and administrative agencies, not courts, should
determine the trade-offs between ecological and economic considerations. These
institutions should make the thousands of decisions concerning a myriad of
issues required to enact a national emissions reduction program. Climate change
policy should not evolve from an amalgamation of uncoordinated, individual
court decisions in venues scattered throughout the country.
Public interest tort litigation against manufacturers of disease-causing
products poses similar separation of powers concerns. Fundamentally, the
Rhode Island lead pigment litigation posed the issues of whether all lead
contained in paint on the walls of residences in Rhode Island constituted a public
nuisance or only those premises containing lead-based paint hazards;2 and
whether the responsibility for abating the nuisances should rest with property
owners or with producers of lead pigment.246 The Rhode Island legislature had

Separation ofPowers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1190-91 (1999) (concluding that

the separation of powers is implied in states lacking such a constitutional provision).
242. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 133-34 (3d ed. 2000); see
also Michael C. Dorf, The Relevance of FederalNorms for State Separation of Powers, 4 ROGER

WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 51, 53-56, 59 (1998). But see Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255
(1957) ("[T]he concept of separation of powers embodied in the United States Constitution is not
mandatory in state governments." (citing Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902))); Dreyer, 187 U.S.
at 84 ("Whether the legislative, executive and judicial powers of a State shall be kept altogether
distinct and separate, ... is for the determination of the State.").
243. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 16 (1998); Harold H. Bruff,
Separation of Powers under the Texas Constitution, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1337, 1348 (1990) ("[T]he

legislature's power is plenary ... subject only to limits found in the state or federal constitution.").
244. See HART & SACKS, supra note 187, at 145-50.
245. Peter B. Lord, Jury in Lead-PaintLawsuit Asks Judgefor Clarifications,PROVIDENCE J.,

Oct. 26, 2002, at A6.
246. DONALD G. GIFFORD, SUING THE TOBACCO AND LEAD PIGMENT INDUSTRIES 148-55

(2010).
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previously answered both questions, at least in part. Statutes declared that a
public nuisance consisted of any residential rental unit where an owner failed to
meet lead hazard reduction orders 2 47 and placed the responsibility for
remediation squarely on the shoulders of the property owner.248 In these
circumstances, the trial court's conclusions that the "presence of lead pigment in
paints and coatings in or on buildings" itself "constitute[d] a public nuisance"
and that the pigment manufacturers should abate the public nuisance249 displayed
a lack of deference to and respect for the coordinate branches of government.
Separation of powers concerns are less obvious and more questionable in
lawsuits brought by states and cities against manufacturers of tobacco products
and handguns seeking damages. The requested relief in these lawsuits usually
consists of reimbursement for funds expended to address product-caused public
health crises. 2 50 Adjudicating a request for damages is a traditional judicial
function and, on its face, does not appear to intrude upon the powers allocated to
the legislative and executive branches. Yet, as previously considered, the patent
intent of the attorneys filing legal actions was to replace the existing regulatory
regimes.251 The tobacco and handgun litigation, as well as climate change and
lead pigment litigation, implicated both judicial competence and separation of
powers concerns. The litigants asked courts to assume the society-wide
regulatory powers traditionally assumed by the political branches. Further, the
litigation inherently required balancing policy factors for which no judicially
discoverable and manageable standards exist-both in deciding whether a public
nuisance existed and in designing a remedy. Even though the complaints in the
states' tobacco litigation sought damages as a remedy, the detailed provisions of
the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) that ended the litigation were no
accident. The MSA consisted of regulatory standards of the kind that our
customary practices of governance suggest should result from a political process,
not the reasoned elaboration of the judicial process.
V. DOCTRINAL EXIT RAMPS FOR PUBLIC PRODUCTS LITIGATION
During the past fifteen years, plaintiffs frequently have filed tort actions
aimed primarily at creating judicial regulatory regimes. Rarely have they been
successful, however.252
The states' tobacco litigation, resolved through

247. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-24.6-23(d) (2008).
248. Id. at §42-128.1-7 to -8 (2006).

249. State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 442 (R.I. 2008).
250. See supranotes 88, 103-04 and accompanying text.
251. See supra Part III.A-D.
252. See, e.g., City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 404 (2d Cir. 2008)
(dismissing plaintiffs public nuisance claim against gun manufacturers and suppliers); City of
Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112, 129 (3d Cir. 1993) (dismissing plaintiffs'
abatement claim against lead pigment manufacturers); NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d
435, 526 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing plaintiffs public nuisance claim against handgun
manufacturers, distributors, and importers for failure to prove the elements of the cause of action).
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settlement, is arguably an exception. But even here, some public health experts
viewed the Master Settlement Agreement as a failure,
and the tobacco
companies' willingness to settle was motivated more by a desire to avoid
regulation through the political branches than from fear of liability.254 In the
other cycles of tort actions intended to overturn the enactments or forbearance of
the political branches of government, courts have almost always rejected the
invitation to regulate industries or solve large-scale social problems.
Part V explores the reasons behind the dismissal of actions brought by state
and local governments and other collective entities against the manufacturers of
products such as tobacco, handguns, and lead paint. Courts either decided that
the substantive tort, usually public nuisance, was not broad enough to encompass
the collective action envisioned by the attorney general and the mass tort
attorneys255 or that the harm to the state, city, or other collective entity was
"derivative and remote."256 Part VI evaluates whether two of the judicial
restraint doctrines developed in contexts outside the common law of torts,
namely standing and the political question doctrine, should preclude the courts'
substantive consideration of climate change litigation and possibly even other
forms of public interest tort litigation. Regardless of the doctrines in play,
lurking in the background of these cases is a nascent, common theme: It is not
the function of the judiciary, using tort law, to perform essentially macroregulatory functions.
A. Dismissal on Substantive Grounds:Public Nuisance
When courts have ruled in cases involving legal actions brought by state and
municipal governments against product manufacturers, such as the
manufacturers of handguns
and lead pigment,2 58 they almost always have

253. See, e.g., DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH

A DEADLY INDUSTRY 360-61 (2001) (discussing the views of Kessler, the former commissioner of
the Food and Drug Administration and a proponent of strong anti-tobacco regulation, on the MSA);
Renee Twombly, Tobacco Settlement Seen as Opportunity Lost to Curb Cigarette Use, 96 J.NAT'L
CANCER INST. 730 (2004), available at http://jnci.oxfordjournals.org/content/96/10/730.full.pdf
("Many physicians and public health officials who have long been involved in trying to curb the
nation's craving for tobacco see the MSA as just one more example of how the tobacco industry has
outsmarted its opponents at every turn.").
254. See Rabin, supra note 83, at 339-41 (discussing pre-MSA proposed legislation that
would have placed larger financial obligations and regulatory restrictions on the tobacco industry
than the MSA ultimately did).
255. See infra Part V.A.
256. See infra Part V.B.
257. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 422 (3d Cir. 2002)
(dismissing claim because "plaintiffs fail[ed] to state a cognizable public nuisance claim against the
gun manufacturers"); Camden Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d
536, 540-41 (3d Cir. 2001) (per curiam) ("To extend public nuisance law to embrace the
manufacture of handguns would be unprecedented under New Jersey state law and unprecedented
nationwide for an appellate court."); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099,
1115-16 (Ill. 2004) ("[T]here is no authority for the unprecedented expansion of the concept of
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rejected the expansion of the traditional boundaries of public nuisance liability to
include product-caused harms. 259 The federal common law of nuisance and state
public nuisance law also provide the principal substantive claims in the climate
change litigation.260

public rights . . . . [P]laintiffs' claim does not meet all the required elements of a public nuisance
action....").
258. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 133 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005) (dismissing claim because plaintiff failed to adequately allege that the defendants' products
proximately caused a public nuisance); City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d
110, 116 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) (dismissing city's public nuisance claim because it could not prove
causation due to lack of product identification evidence); In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 502
(N.J. 2007) (dismissing public nuisance claim because the lead-based paint products had "become
dangerous through deterioration and poor maintenance by the purchasers"); State v. Lead Indus.
Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 452-55 (R.I. 2008) (dismissing claim because the complaint failed to allege a
public right and failed to show that defendant had control over the product at time of the harm).
259. But see City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1141-44 (Ohio
2002) (refusing to dismiss a public nuisance claim against firearm manufacturers); City of
Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 691 N.W.2d 888, 892, 897 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (allowing claim of
public nuisance to proceed against lead paint manufacturers).
Courts have also dismissed causes of action against product manufacturers based on other
claims (e.g., unjust enrichment) that attempt to aggregate individual harms and pursue collective
grounds for recovery, e.g., Perry v. Am. Tobacco Co., 324 F.3d 845, 851 (6th Cir. 2003)
(dismissing unjust enrichment claim on remoteness grounds); Or. Laborers-Emp'rs Health &
Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 185 F.3d 957, 968 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[Plaintiffs] cannot
maintain an action for unjust enrichment against the defendants just because the defendants were
incidentally benefitted."), and indemnity, e.g., Serv. Emp. Int'1 Union Health & Welfare Fund v.
Philip Morris Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 70, 93 (D.D.C. 1999) (rejecting plaintiffs' tort theory of
indemnity); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 610, 621-22 (W.D. Pa.
1999) (dismissing hospital's indemnity action because the hospital wasn't "liable for any torts
committed [by defendants] upon [its] . . . patients with tobacco-related diseases"). For more
discussion on unjust enrichment and indemnity claims, see Gifford, supra note 77, at 929-32.
260. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 314 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting
that plaintiffs, in seeking to force defendants to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, brought their
claims "under the federal common law of nuisance or, in the alternative, state nuisance law");
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 869 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (noting
that plaintiffs brought claims under both federal common law and state public nuisance law).
Whether or not a federal common law of nuisance exists and applies to the climate change
litigation is a hotly disputed issue between the parties. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in
Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss the Complaints for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim upon Which Relief Can Be Granted at 8-13,
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 1:04-CV-05669LAP), 2004 WL 5614405. This issue is not considered in this Article because it is not directly
relevant to the characteristics defining public interest tort law or the legitimacy of this litigation
phenomenon.
I also did not consider whether the Clean Air Act displaces the federal common law of
nuisance, see Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 371-88, or preempts state law public nuisance
claims. This topic, while obviously relevant to separation of powers concerns, has not played a
critical role in the current round of climate change litigation. Currently, the EPA is proceeding with
plans to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE
OF TRANSP. AND AIR QUALITY, EPA-420-F-10-014, EPA AND NHTSA FINALIZE HISTORIC
NATIONAL PROGRAM To REDUCE GREENHOUSE GASES AND IMPROVE FUEL ECONOMY FOR CARS

AND TRUCKS (2010), and will soon regulate emissions from industrial sources, David A.
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As described later in this section, when courts dismissed public interest tort
actions, they sometimes did so noting that a contrary holding would create a
conflict with regulatory frameworks previously established by the legislature.
Whether or not courts openly acknowledged it, their more restrictive
interpretations of public nuisance liability likely emerged from an understanding
that a contrary holding would leave the trial court in the inappropriate situation
of supervising statewide public health remediation measures.
In deciding whether to extend public nuisance liability to the manufacturers
of products that caused public health problems, courts had a choice. On one
hand, many courts in the past defined public nuisance in a very vague, expansive
manner. For example, the Supreme Court of Florida proclaimed that "a public
nuisance may be classified as something that causes 'any annoyance to the
community or harm to public health.'
Particularly in an era in which
plaintiffs' attorneys and judicial clerks both use online database searches as their
primary form of legal research, it would be understandable (but wrong) for a
court to apply such a broad definition to the facts of childhood lead poisoning or
handgun violence and syllogistically conclude that a plaintiff had established a
public nuisance. Simplistically, any mass product that causes repeated and
numerous harms probably fits within this textual description of a public
nuisance. On the other hand, the long history of public nuisance law shows that
courts traditionally impose liability only under far more restrictive
circumstances.262
In its leading decision in State v. Lead Industries Ass 'n,2 63 the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that the lead pigment producers' manufacture and
distribution of lead pigment did not constitute a public nuisance.2 64 In other

Fahrenthold & Juliet Eilperin, EPA to Pick up Climate Change Where Congress Left Off WASH.

POST, Aug. 4, 2010, at A3. It is likely that federal preemption will play a relevant role, perhaps a
decisive role-and one obviously intertwined with separation of powers-in future climate change
litigation.
261. Flo-Sun, Inc. v. Kirk, 783 So. 2d 1029, 1036 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Kirk v. U.S. Sugar
Corp., 726 So. 2d 822, 826 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)). In 1982, the Supreme Court of Illinois
acknowledged the indeterminate boundaries of public nuisance liability when it stated that "[t]he
concept of common law public nuisance does elude precise definition." City of Chicago v. Festival
Theatre Corp., 438 N.E.2d 159, 164 (Ill. 1982).
262. See Gifford, supra note 120, at 800-33.
263. 951 A.2d 428 (R.I. 2008).
264. Id. at 455. The court began with the generally accepted notion that for a defendant to be
held liable for a public nuisance, the defendant's activities must have violated "a right common to
the general public." Id at 446. Production and sale of lead pigment used in lead-based paint does
not constitute a violation of a public right. Id. at 455. The court also noted that a "public nuisance
typically arises on a defendant's land," a factor not present in the case. Id at 452 (citing In re Lead
PaintLitig., 924 A.2d at 496); see also City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099,
1117 (Ill. 2004) (noting that Illinois courts have applied the public nuisance doctrine many times
where the defendant's conduct in creating the nuisance involved the use of land). Third, the court
concluded that to be held liable for public nuisance, "a defendant must have control over the
instrumentality causing the alleged nuisance at the time the damage occurs." Lead Indus. Ass'n,

951 A.2d at 449; see also In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 499 ("[A] public nuisance, by
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cases, courts similarly have almost universally rejected government actions
claiming public nuisance liability and seeking to substitute judicial action for
what state attorneys general and mass plaintiffs' attorneys claim are inadequate
responses to public health problems from the political branches of
government. 265 Though generally unarticulated, it seems likely that the issue of
judicial competence played a major role in these decisions. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court presumably was not oblivious to the fact that if it had affirmed
the trial court judgment finding a public nuisance and ordering the defendants to
abate it,266 the trial court would then have been required to su ervise the
remediation of lead paint hazards in more than 240,000 residences. 2 6 Nor were
the courts that dismissed public nuisance cases against handgun manufacturers
blind to the reality that a contrary ruling would have necessitated that trial court
judges regulate the sale and distribution of handguns. 2 68 Given the choice
between hewing close to the line of long-standing requirements for public
nuisance liability and expanding those requirements to meet new social realities,
courts chose the more conservative approach.
In another, more explicit manner, the recent dismissal of public nuisance
claims against lead pigment manufacturers reflects separation of powers
concerns-namely, courts' recognition that contrary holdings would result in
direct conflicts with prior legislative regulations. 269 In the Rhode Island opinion,
the court stressed that the legislature had enacted a program for preventing
childhood lead poisoning that would be inconsistent with holding the lead
pigment manufacturers liable. 27 0 The court noted that "the General Assembly
has recognized that landlords . . . are responsible for maintaining their premises

definition, is related to conduct, performed in a location within the actor's control, which has an
adverse effect on a common right."). Finally, the court held that the defendants' manufacture and
distribution of the product was not a proximate cause of the alleged public health harm. Lead Indus.
Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 455; see also City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 133 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2005) (noting that proximate causation is a requirement in a public nuisance action); City
of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 116 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) (holding that the
plaintiff failed to meet its causation burden in its public nuisance claim).
265. See City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 404 (2d Cir. 2008); City of
Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112, 129 (3d Cir. 1993).
266. See Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 434.

267. See id. at 438 n.5. Defendant Sherwin-Williams argued that what the State had proposed
was "a statewide abatement program" that would "transform special masters into a mini-agency
making and implementing statewide public health policy." Brief of the Sherwin-Williams
Company on Separation of Powers, Constitutional Error, and Trial Error at 21, Lead Indus. Ass'n,
951 A.2d 428 (No. 07-121-A), 2008 WL 5748817.
268. See cases cited supra note 257. As Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo wrote, "Not the origin,
but the goal, is the main thing. There can be no wisdom in the choice of a path unless we know
where it will lead." BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 102 (1921).

269. See City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 139 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)
(citing 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/1 to /17 (West 2005)); In re Lead PaintLitig., 924 A.2d at
505; Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 457-58.
270. LeadIndus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 457-58.
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and ensuring that the premises are lead-safe."27 1 Similarly, in its decision
dismissing public nuisance claims against lead pigment and paint manufacturers,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that the legislature had concluded that
the property owner whose poor maintenance practices "created the nuisance"
should be responsible for lead hazard abatement.272 If either the Rhode Island
Supreme Court or New Jersey Supreme Court had ruled that pigment
manufacturers were responsible for creating the nuisance and for cleaning it up,
the ruling would have established a conflict with the legislature's prior
enactments.2 73 This reasoning, relying on separation of powers concerns, led
each state supreme court to construe public nuisance liability narrowly to avoid
such a conflict. 274

271.
272.
273.
274.

Id. at 457.
In re Lead PaintLitig., 924 A.2d at 501.
See id. at 494; Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951A.2d at 457-58.
In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 494-99; Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 446-52.

Most of the requirements for public nuisance liability are satisfied in the climate change litigation.
See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 352-53 (2d Cir. 2009). But public
nuisance claims against defendants in climate change litigation still face two, perhaps
insurmountable, obstacles. The minimal, even trivial, contributions of any particular defendant to
the alleged public nuisance may be inadequate to establish the required element of causation. Cf
Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1163 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding the presence
of defendant's asbestos-containing product at plaintiffs workplace insufficient to raise an inference
that the exposure was a substantial factor in plaintiff's development of asbestosis); Peerman v. AC
& S, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 388, 389 (S.D. Ind. 1993) (finding that testimony indicating plaintiff had
once walked through an area where asbestos was being used for a total of one week at his workplace
did not satisfy causation requirement); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§§

431, 433 (1965)

(requiring defendant's conduct to be a "substantial factor" in order to constitute causation in
negligence law and providing that the extent to which other factors contribute to the harm is a
relevant factor).
The second obstacle to recovery is the requirement that the defendant's interference with the
plaintiffs public rights be "unreasonable." See Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 446; RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979). I think an open question exists regarding whether a jury
would find that supplying electricity to the northeastern quadrant of the United States, at a
reasonable cost, is unreasonable, even if it does cause a 2.5% increase in human contributions to
global warming. See supranotes 9-12 and accompanying text.
Until recently, liberal pleading requirements meant that it was unlikely that defendants could
have these public nuisance claims dismissed early in the proceedings, and that these issues of
causation and "unreasonable interference" probably would not be resolved until the trial, or at least
until the summary judgment phase of litigation. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)
("[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon
which he bases his claim. . . . [A]ll the Rules require is 'a short and plain statement of the claim'
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2))); Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d
247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8; Am. Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 72324 (7th Cir. 1986)) (noting that complaints are "supposed to be succinct" and are not required to
recite elaborate facts). However, the Supreme Court recently has held that federal courts can
dismiss a complaint when its allegations are implausible or merely conclusory. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-66
(2007)).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

37

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 2

238

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

B.

[VOL. 62: 201

"Remote and Derivative" Harms

When a government or other collective entity, acting as a "super-plaintiff,"
seeks to recover for an amalgamation of harms originally sustained by many
individuals and sues a product manufacturer or other business, courts often
dismiss the action because the plaintiffs claims are "remote and derivative.,275
Courts have frequently used this reasoning when a state276 or municipal
277
278
279
government, a hospital, a medical insurance company, or a union health
and welfare benefits plan280 sues tortfeasors who have injured victims for whom
the collective entity later provided medical expense reimbursement. On its face,
the language of these opinions appears to respond to claims for damages, but in
reality, plaintiffs filed many of these legal actions to implement a new regulatory
protocol. 281
Sometimes the "remote and derivative" basis for dismissal is seated within
the requirements for standing. For example, in Ganim v. Smith & Wesson

275. See, e.g., City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Philip Morris, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1130, 114143 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that payment of medical bills resulting from tobacco companies'
actions was too remote to justify recovery under the common law of negligence); District of
Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A., Corp., 872 A.2d 633, 661 (D.C. 2005) (en banc) (dismissing public
nuisance claim due to a tenuous causal chain); cf City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823
N.E.2d 126, 133 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (rejecting the city's claim against a manufacturer of lead
pigment because of a lack of proximate causation); People ex rel Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.,
761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 201 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (finding a lack of duty and proximate causation
because of a tenuous causal chain).
276. See, e.g., State ex rel Miller v. Philip Morris, Inc. 577 N.W.2d 401, 406 (Iowa 1998)
(dismissing claim "because the injures [were] derivative and too remote" (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Lead Indus. Ass', 951 A.2d at 455 ("[T]here was no set of facts alleged in the state's
complaint that, even if proven, could have demonstrated that defendants' conduct . . . interfered
with a public right or that defendants had control over the product. . . .").
277. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 426 (3d Cir. 2002)
(dismissing claim on grounds that the connection between the City's injuries and the handgun
manufacturers' conduct was "attenuated and weak"); Camden Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v.
Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 541 (3d Cir. 2001) ("This causal chain is simply too attenuated
to attribute sufficient control to the manufacturers to make out a public nuisance claim."); Ganim v.
Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 129-30 (Conn. 2001) ("[T]he [city and Mayor] lack standing
because the harms they claim are too remote from the defendants' misconduct, and are too
derivative of the injuries of others . . . .").
278. See, e.g., Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 610, 617 (W.D.
Pa. 1999) (dismissing a hospital's claim for "being too remotely connected in the causal chain from
any wrongdoing on defendants' part" (quoting Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 928 (3d Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
279. See, e.g., State ex rel Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 495 (Minn.
1996) (finding that plaintiffs injury was too remote for recovery).
280. See, e.g., Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229,
244 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[T]he economic injuries alleged in plaintiffs' complaint are purely derivative
of the physical injuries suffered by plan participants and therefore too remote . . . for them to have
standing to sue defendants.").
281. See supra PartIII.
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Corp.,282 the municipality of Bridgeport sued manufacturers of handguns,
claiming harm to the city resulting from handgun violence, including
expenditures for additional police, emergency, and social service functions, and
loss of investment, economic development, and tax revenues attributable to loss
of productivity.283 The court held that the city lacked standing because the
injuries were too remote and derivative to enable it to recover.284 It traced the
distribution of the manufacturers' products through the distribution chain,
including gun wholesalers or distributors, retailers, legitimate or illegal
consumers, and ultimately into the hands of unauthorized users who acquired the
guns in the "illegal market" and then inflicted harm on victims. 28 5
On other occasions, the "remote and derivative" nature of the harms suffered
by the government or another collective plaintiff led the court to conclude that
the plaintiff had not established the requisite element of proximate causation. In
City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,286 the Illinois Supreme Court held that
because the alleged public nuisance in Chicago was "several times removed from
the initial sale of individual weapons" by the defendant gun manufacturers, the
manufacturers neither owed a duty nor proximately caused the city's asserted
harms. 287 Finally, in other instances, courts appear to dismiss actions on a
"remote and derivative" basis without explicitly tying the analysis to either
standing or proximate causation.288
In effect, these opinions hold that municipal governments and other
collective entities cannot ask the judicial system to regulate products that cause
widespread, collective harms or harms that occur to others. Courts use different
doctrinal labels, but the real message is that these are not the kind of person-toperson disputes that courts should be adjudicating. Instead, these are societal
problems that the legislative branch and administrative agencies should address.

282. 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001).
283. Id. at 108-09.
284. Id. at 133-34.
285. Id. at 123-24 (internal quotation marks omitted).
286. 821 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2004).
287. Id. at 1137-38, 1148.
288. See, e.g., State ex rel. Miller v. Philip Morris Inc., 577 N.W.2d 401, 406-07 (Iowa 1998)
(dismissing claim based on the "remoteness doctrine" and describing it as "a legal doctrine
incorporating public policy considerations" (quoting Kraft Chem. Co. v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 608
N.E.2d 243, 245 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992))); State ex rel Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d
490, 495 (Minn. 1996) (applying the remoteness doctrine to dismiss a suit against tobacco
companies).
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VI. APPLYING JUDICIAL
LITIGATION

RESTRAINT DOCTRINES

[VOL. 62: 201

TO CLIMATE CHANGE

Beginning with the climate change litigation, tort actions designed to impose
comprehensive regulation found a new home-federal courts.289 Two different
requirements of federal justiciability-standing and the political question
doctrine-now arguably provided courts, at least in some circumstances, with
grounds to dismiss public interest tort actions intended to implement macro
regulation. This Part contends that the judicial restraint principles of standing
and the political question doctrine, most often regarded as out of place in tort
actions between private parties, have an important role to play in public interest
tort actions. Laurence Tribe, perhaps the nation's preeminent constitutional law
scholar, and two coauthors recently addressed the Second Circuit's decision in
Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.290 They noted that the Supreme
Court has made it obvious "[t]hat courts must look beyond the label attached to
the plaintiffs cause of action . . . .,,291 Tribe and his colleagues suggested that

the Court should use the standing doctrine "to prevent some of the most
audacious judicial sallies into the political thicket, as it might in the climate
change case, where plaintiffs assert only undifferentiated and generalized causal
chains from their chosen defendants to their alleged injuries."292 Finally, they
also urged the Court to intervene and restore the political question doctrine's
"bulwark against judicial meddling in disputes ... so plainly immune to coherent
judicial management as to be implicitly entrusted to political processes."293
A. Standing
1. Purposes Served by the Standing Doctrine

When plaintiffs-regardless of whether they are state governments, 294
municipal governments,295 members of a certified class, 296 land trusts, 297 or self-

289. See Laurence H. Tribe et al., Too Hotfor Courts to Handle: Fuel Temperatures, Global
Warming, and the Political Question Doctrine 1-3 (Wash. Legal Found. Critical Legal Issues

Working Paper Series No. 169, 2010), available at http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/
workingpaper/012910Tribe wp.pdf.
290. Id. at 12-14.
291. Id. at 14.
292. Id. at 24.
293. Id.
294. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 316 (2d Cir. 2009) (listing eight
states as plaintiffs: California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont,
and Wisconsin).
295. See id. (listing New York City as a plaintiff).
296. See Comer v. Murphy Oil, USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009) (identifying class
members as residents and owners of Mississippi Gulf Coast properties).
297. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 318 (identifying three land trusts as plaintiffs filing a
separate complaint).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol62/iss2/2

40

Gifford: Climate Change and the Public Law Model of Torts: Reinvigorating

2010]

CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE PUBLIC LAW MODEL OF TORTS

241

governing Native American tribes 298 sued private defendants contributing to
global climate change, they each faced challenges regarding their standing to file
such claims. 299 A leading treatise defines standing as a requirement of
justiciability that enables courts "to refuse to determine the merits of a legal
claim, on the ground that even though the claim may be correct the litigant
advancing it is not properly situated to be entitled to its judicial
determination." 300
One set of justifications for the standing doctrine focuses on the judicial
process itself. First, adjudications begun by litigants without concrete and
immediate harms traceable to the activities of the government or other
defendants may yield poor results.301 As Justice Kennedy explained in his
concurring opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,302 the requirement of a
"concrete and personal" injury "preserves the vitality of the adversarial process
by assuring ... that the parties ... have an actual, as opposed to professed, stake
in the outcome .. "3 This assures, continued Justice Kennedy, "that 'the legal
questions presented . . . will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a
debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action."' 304 Second, requiring
courts to entertain the merits of cases that do not require resolution could flood
the courts and strain judicial resources.305 Third, according to Maxwell Stearns,
the standing doctrine reduces the ability of special interest groups to "game the

298. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868 (N.D. Cal.
2009).
299. Comer, 585 F.3d at 860-69; Am. ElectricPower Co., 582 F.3d at 332-49; Kivalina, 663

F. Supp. 2d at 877-82.
300. 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531 (3d
ed. 2008) (citing Ala. Power Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 307 F.3d 1300, 1308 (11th Cir. 2002)).
301. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 542 (1986) ("[S]tanding
requirements ... ensure that our deliberations will have the benefit of adversary presentation and a
full development of the relevant facts."); Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III:

Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 309 (1979) ("[A]

traditional plaintiff [is] better able vividly to illustrate the adverse effects of the complained-of
activity[.]").
302. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
303. Id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
304. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (omissions in original) (quoting Valley Forge Christian
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
305. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[W]e
risk ... impairment of the effectiveness of the federal courts if their limited resources are diverted
increasingly from their historic role to the resolution of public-interest suits brought by litigants who
cannot distinguish themselves from all taxpayers or all citizens."); Ill. Dep't of Transp. v. Hinson,
122 F.3d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The main contemporary reason for having rules of standing ...
is to prevent kibitzers, bureaucrats, publicity seekers, and 'cause' mongers from wresting control of
litigation from the people directly affected ..... (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at
473; People Organized for Welfare & Emp't Rights v. Thompson, 727 F.2d 167, 172 (7th Cir.
1984))); Thompson, 727 F.2d at 173 ("If passionate commitment plus money for litigating were all
that was necessary to open the doors of the federal courts, those courts, already overburdened with
litigation of every description, might be overwhelmed.").
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system" through control of the order in which the Supreme Court considers
cases.306 This sequencing of cases can influence "the substantive evolution of
legal doctrine" 307 because of the precedential effects of the first cases in the
queue. 308 If interest groups were able to select cases with facts most likely to
yield decisions consistent with their ideological causes and without any
requirement that the plaintiff experienced a discrete and concrete injury, it would
be easier for them to "manipulate" the development of the law. 309
The second set of justifications for standing consists of objectives arising
from the separation of powers. 310 Steams writes that "the modem standing
doctrine preserves an important distinction between the appropriate nature of
judicial and legislative lawmaking." 311 As previously mentioned, courts
deciding tort disputes create law when a steady stream of tort awards regulates
the conduct of potential tortfeasors. 3 12 But when courts depart from their typical
role of making law only "on an ad hoc and as needed basis," 313 standing
doctrines may be implicated. 314 Congress, not the courts, writes Steams, is the
institution we expect to respond when all of us have been injured.315
Proponents of climate change litigation sometimes argue that courts must
decide these cases because of the political deadlock in Congress. 316 But Steams
317
He
argues that standing also furthers separation of powers in this situation.
reasons, "In contrast with appellate courts, .... legislatures are free not to decide
issues presented to them for consideration . . . ."
Thus, according to Steams,
"standing protects Congress'[s] power to leave issues of law undecided unless
and until an appropriate legislative consensus has formed." 3 19

306. Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest:Justiciabilityand Social Choice, 83
CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1315 (1995).

307. Id. at 1318.
308. Id. at 1318 n.24.
309. See id. at 1319. As Steams explains, "[S]tanding serves the critical function of
encouraging the order in which cases are presented to be based upon fortuity rather than litigant
path manipulation." Id. at 1359. Thus, "standing makes the inevitable path dependency that results
from stare decisis substantially more tolerable." Id.
310. Id. at 1319-20; Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 1432, 1459 (1988).
311. Stearns, supra note 306, at 1319.
312. See supranote 147 and accompanying text.
313. Steams, supra note 306, at 1388.
314. See id. at 1392.
315. Id. at 1406.
316. See supranotes 131, 136-45 and accompanying text.
317. See Steams, supra note 306, at 1319.
318. Id.
319. Id.
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Standing in Climate Change Litigation

When the Second Circuit in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.
and the district court in Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.

addressed the standing issue, both applied the three-part standing test that the
Supreme Court articulated in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. 320 This test requires

the plaintiff to establish (1) an "injury in fact," (2) caused or traceable to the
defendant's activities, which (3) the court is capable of redressing.321 Thomas
W. Merrill, in his analysis of standing requirements in climate change litigation,
finds that the Supreme Court has also required plaintiffs to allege harms that are
not simply "generalized grievances shared by all citizens." 322
In American Electric Power Co., the court noted that "the injury-in-fact

32 3
necessary for standing 'need not be large, an identifiable trifle will suffice."'
It was the second prong of the standing requirements, causation or traceability,
where the dueling courts disagreed. On one hand, the Second Circuit held in
American Electric Power Co. that the plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to
allege that their harms were "'fairly traceable' to [the d]efendants' conduct." 324
The court reasoned that causation for standing purposes is less demanding than
the causation that substantive tort law requires.
It also pointed out that even
when the issue is one of satisfying causation as a substantive element of the
public nuisance claim, the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that "[t]he fact
that other persons contribute to a nuisance is not a bar to the defendant's liability
for his own contribution." 326
On the other hand, the Kivalina court's refusal to grant standing to a "selfgoverning, federally-recognized Tribe of Inupiat Eskimos" 327 also focused on the
causation or traceability requirement. 328 Because of the multitude of other
sources contributing to global warming, that court held that the defendants'

320. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 339 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)); Native Vill. Of Kivalina v.
ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 877 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Sprint Commc'ns Co. v.
APCC Servs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2531, 2535 (2008)).
321. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
322. Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a PublicNuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 293,

295 (2005); see also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173-74 (1874).
323. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 341 (quoting LaFleur v. Whitman, 300 F.3d 256, 270
(2d Cir. 2002)). The Fifth Circuit's three-judge panel in Comer reached the same result. Comer v.
Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 863-64 (5th Cir. 2009). The Kivalina court appeared to implicitly
recognize that injury-in-fact existed. See Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 877-80. For a further
discussion of the injury-in-fact prong of the Lujan test in climate change litigation, see Merrill,
supranote 322, at 295-97.
324. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 347.

325. Id. at 346 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 980 n.7 (4th
Cir. 1992)) ("[T]he 'fairly traceable' standard is not equivalent to a requirement of tort causation.").
326. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840E (1979)).
327. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 868.
328. Id. at 877 (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997)).
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activities were not the "seed" of the plaintiffs' injuries traceable to any of the
defendants. 329 The court also reasoned that the plaintiffs could not satisfy the
causation or traceability requirement because they were not within "the
discharge zone of a polluter and ... [were] so far downstream that their injuries
[could not] fairly be traced to [the] defendant[s]." 330 The opposite conclusion,
noted that court, "suggest[ed] that every inhabitant on this Earth [was] within the
zone of discharge . . . .

In short, the court seemed to accept the idea,

previously presented, that their appropriate role was to adjudicate circumscribed,
bounded disputes, not society-wide or even worldwide problems.332
Regarding the third prong, redressability, the Second Circuit noted that the
Supreme Court had recently stated in Massachusetts v. EPA333 that it is sufficient
to allege "that the requested remedy would 'slow or reduce"' global warming.334
In the Kivalina cases, where the requested remedy was damages,335 there was
obviously no problem with the court's ability to redress the plaintiffs harm
through damage awards if the court traced the plaintiff s harm to the defendant's
conduct.
Merrill's last requirement for standing is that a plaintiffs harms cannot
constitute "a generalized grievance." 336 But in climate change litigation, the
plaintiffs' asserted harms are diffuse and generalized to an unsurpassable
extent-global climate change affects everyone on the Earth.33 7 Merrill
ultimately reaches the conclusion that this requirement could possibly result in

329. Id. at 880.
330. Id. at 881 (quoting Tex. Indep. Producers & Royalty Owners Ass'n v. EPA, 410 F.3d
964, 973 (7th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 95 F.3d 358, 361 (5th Cir. 1996)).
331. Id.
332. See Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 881. Merrill's analysis suggests that both courts were
wrong on this issue. Merrill, supra note 322, at 297-98. Before these decisions, he had prophesied
that in an action for damages, such as Kivalina, "where liability for an indivisible harm might be
apportioned among multiple actors based on some formula (like market share), it [was] doubtful
that a court would dismiss the action for want of standing simply because of the defendant's small
market share." Id. But, he continued, "[p]erhaps in a suit seeking an injunction [such as American
ElectricPower Co.,] relief would be denied ... on grounds of equity." Id. at 298.
333. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
334. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 348 (2d Cir. 2009) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 525).
335. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859-60 (5th Cir. 2009); Kivalina, 663 F.
Supp. 2d at 868.
336. Merrill, supra note 322, at 298; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)
("Standing doctrine embraces ... the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more
appropriately addressed in the representative branches . . . ."); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 176-77 (1974) ("This is surely ...

a generalized grievance .

.

. since the impact on [the

plaintiffl is plainly undifferentiated and 'common to all members of the public."' (quoting Ex parte
Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)) (citing Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13 (1972))).
337. See Merrill, supra note 322, at 298.
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the dismissal of climate change claims brought by both private plaintiffS338 and
states acting asparens patriae.339
The states' standing to sue as parenspatriae in global climate change cases
has gone unchallenged by defendants and other scholars but arguab
undeservedly so. In Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. PuertoRico ex rel. Barez,3

perhaps the United States Supreme Court's most important parens patriae
opinion, the Court held that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico had standing in
federal courts 341 to represent its "[q]uasi-sovereign interests . . . in the well-being
of its populace." 342 This language provides an expansive understanding of
parens patriae standing. 3 4 3

However, a careful analysis of Supreme Court

opinions decided before Snapp suggests a narrower interpretation of this form of
standing. Early parens patriae cases consisted almost entirely of disputes
between adjoining or nearby states with regard to natural resources and
territory. 344 For example, in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,345 Georgia
sought an injunction against a Tennessee manufacturing company for the
discharge of noxious gases over its territory.346 Other Supreme Court decisions
have recognized a state's ability to sue parens patriae to protect its residents
against economic discrimination when such discrimination stems from the
victims' identities as citizens of the state.347 These precedents set the stage for
the decision in Snapp in which the Supreme Court held that Puerto Rico had a
quasi-sovereign interest in protecting its residents from employment
discrimination348 because it "ha[d] an interest in securing observance of the
terms under which it participate[d] in the federal system." 349
In every one of these precedents, the harms suffered by the original
(individual) victims-the "populace" whose "well-being" was being protectedwere causally connected to their residency within a particular state. In each of

338. Id. at 298-99.
339. Id. at 304-05.
340. 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
341. Id. at 609.
342. Id. at 602.
343. The fact that the Court felt compelled to immediately limit the impact of its holding
suggests that it recognized the expansive nature of its language: "Formulated so broadly, the [wellbeing of the populace] concept risks being too vague to survive the standing requirements of Art.
III: A quasi-sovereign interest must be sufficiently concrete to create an actual controversy between
the State and the defendant." Id.
344. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117 (1907) (determining whether the
depletion of water from the Arkansas River by the State of Colorado for irrigation purposes injured
the State of Kansas); Missouri v. Illinois (Missouri 1), 180 U.S. 208, 242-43 (1901) (addressing
Missouri's nuisance action against Illinois for the Mississippi River bringing sewage from Chicago
into Missouri).
345. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
346. Id. at 236.
347. E.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 591 (1923) (allowing a state to sue for
an injunction to stop the cutting of fuel supplies to the state).
348. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 608.
349. Id. at 607-08.
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the economic discrimination cases, the economically harmed individuals were
harmed because they were citizens of a particular state and not another
jurisdiction.350 Similarly, in the pollution cases, the harms to private property
owners occurred because their properties, polluted by the defendant's activities,
were physically located at a particular location within the plaintiff state's
territorial boundaries instead of anywhere else on the face of the Earth. 51In
other words, in each instance, the victims' harms were directly related and
causally connected to their identity as residents of the state that sought to
vindicate their interests through parenspatriae litigation.
In contrast, the state of residence and the harm sustained are independent
variables in climate change parenspatriaeactions.352 Global climate change is a
worldwide problem, and an individual's residence in Connecticut neither
increases nor decreases the threat of global climate change to that person.
Unless courts decide that states are entitled to assume the role of "superplaintiff' and assert the rights of victims of harms that are limited by neither
jurisdiction nor geography, granting states standing to assert their claims seems
out of place.
In Massachusetts v. EPA the Supreme Court held that Massachusetts and the
other plaintiff states had standing as parens patriaeto sue the EPA353 to compel
it to regulate the emissions of four greenhouse gases under the provisions of the
Clean Air Act.354 This holding does not necessarily mean, however, that states
or other plaintiffs have standing in federal court to sue private defendants on
common law tort claims. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, found that the
Clean Air Act itself granted litigants a procedural right to challenge the EPA's
rejection of its rulemaking authority and that a state "is entitled to special
solicitude in our standing analysis."355 The Court reasoned, "When a State
enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives. Massachusetts
cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions,
[and] it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India. ...
These
powers, continued the Court, "are now lodged in the Federal Government, and

350. For example, in Snapp, the Court focused on the fact that the injured were almost
exclusively Puerto Rican. See id. at 594. "[W]e have no doubt that a State could seek, in federal
courts, to protect its residents from such discrimination to the extent that it violates federal law." Id.
at 609. In StandardOil, Hawaii alleged in its parenspatriaeclaim that the defendants monopolized
only Hawaii's petroleum market in violation of antitrust laws. StandardOil, 405 U.S. at 254-55.
351. For example, in Tenn. Copper Co., Georgia's bill in equity only cited damages that
occurred within the state as result of the [d]efendant's noxious gas. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at
236.
352. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007) (noting that the "climate-change
risks are 'widely shared').
353. Id. at 526.
354. Id. at 505. For the provision of the Clean Air Act at issue in Massachusetts v. EPA, see
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i) (2006).
355. EPA, 549 U.S. at 520 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2006)).
356. Id. at 519.
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[in exchange,] Congress has ordered EPA to protect Massachusetts . . . ."357 Of
course, no state's relationship within the federal political structure is at stake
when it brings a common law tort action against private defendants. And it is the
EPA, not the states, that the Court admonished to fulfill its statutory obligation to
address the issue of greenhouse gases. 358 Accordingly, no "special solicitude in
standing analysis" is owed to the states in common law tort actions against
private defendants.
It is not surprising that the early decisions on standing in climate change
litigation reach conflicting conclusions. On one hand, the standing issue seems
strangely out of place in a tort action where each plaintiff alleges that each
defendant has contributed to his becoming a victim of an indivisible harm.
Traditionally, the standing issue has been raised when a litigant challenges the
action-or more often, the inaction-of the political branches of government on
the basis of a statutory or constitutional claim. 359 It has been argued that in tort
litigation, the issue of standing collapses into the substantive cause of action.360
Obviously, plaintiffs must allege and prove injury in fact and causation as part of
their substantive causes of action.36 Moreover, courts usually hold that the
proper ground for dismissal of a tort claim is on substantive grounds, not the
standing issue. 362 But they sometimes dismiss tort actions on standing grounds,
usually when class action representatives seek to represent the interests of others
whose situations vary, at least to some extent, from their own.363
On the other hand, the judicial competency and separation of powers
rationales for standing strongly support the conclusion that courts should deny
standing in climate change litigation. Harms that are this pervasive are matters

357. Id.
358. See id. at 521 ("EPA's steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions presents a
risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both 'actual' and 'imminent."' (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992))).
359. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure ofStanding, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 250-51 (1988).
360. See Steams, supra note 306, at 1321.
361. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 281

(1965).

362. See, e.g., Jackson v. Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc., 462 F.3d 1234, 1242 (10th Cir. 2006)
(holding that plaintiffs' failure to prove their alleged injuries under tort claims warranted summary
judgment for the defendant and not dismissal for lack of standing); cf Sunrise Corp. of Myrtle
Beach v. City of Myrtle Beach, 420 F.3d 322, 325 n.1 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Rivanna Trawlers
Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 239 (4th Cir. 1988)) (finding that the district
court erred in dismissing claims for lack of standing and should have evaluated whether an injury in
fact was present as an element of a substantive federal claim).
363. See e.g., Alston v. Advanced Brands & Importing Co., 494 F.3d 562, 564 (6th Cir. 2007)
(dismissing claims brought by parents against brewers and importers of alcoholic beverages
claiming that the defendants' advertising caused underage children to purchase alcoholic beverages
when none of the class representatives claimed that their own children purchased any alcohol);
Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 283 F.3d 315, 316-17 (5th Cir. 2002) (dismissing class action filed
on behalf of all patients who had ingested a drug subsequently found to have caused liver damage in
a handful of patients when the class excluded patients who had suffered either physical or emotional
harm).
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that our constitutional framework makes the responsibility of Congress or the
EPA to address if either deems regulation advisable.
B.

The Political Question Doctrine
1. Purposes Served by the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine

The political question doctrine prevents federal courts from deciding a claim
when "the question is entrusted to one of the political branches or involves no
judicially enforceable rights." 364 As in the case of standing, the roots of the
political question doctrine lie in separation of powers principles.365 Courts may
decline jurisdiction both because of the Constitution, which limits federal
judicial power to "cases" and "controversies," 366 and because of "prudential"
considerations that suggest judicial restraint. 367 Such prudential considerations
include judicial deference to the decisions of colleagues operating within the
executive and legislative branches, 3 6 8 and a sense that a court may not be the
appropriate forum for deciding such matters.369 In short, these are the exact
factors previously analyzed in Part IV.
In the leading case of Baker v. Carr, 0 the Supreme Court identified six
factors that individually or in combination may lead a court to conclude that an
issue poses a political question. 371 Here, the first three factors are relevant: "a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion. ... 372 During

364. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004). Also, in Corrie v. Caterpillar,Inc., 503
F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit dismissed on political question grounds a tort action
filed by family members of those killed or injured when Israeli security personnel used bulldozers
manufactured by the defendant to demolish homes in Palestinian territory, id. at 977, because
"[a]llowing this action to proceed would necessarily require the judicial branch ... to question the
political branches' decision to grant extensive military aid to Israel." Id. at 982.
365. See e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1148 (2009) ("[C]ourts have no
charter to review and revise legislative and executive action."); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210
(1962) ("The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of
powers.").
366. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
367. Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise ofJudicialSupremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 253 (2002).
368. See id. at 246. For Professor Barkow's full discussion on prudential considerations in the
political question doctrine, see id. at 253-72.
369. See Martin H. Redish, JudicialReview and the "PoliticalQuestion," 79 Nw. U. L. REv.
1031, 1043-44 (1984-1985).
370. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
371. Id. at 217.
372. Id. The remaining three factors are as follows: "the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
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recent decades, at least until 2004, the political question doctrine was relegated
to a minor role.373 In the forty years following Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court
declined jurisdiction only twice because a case posed a political question. 37 4
Each of these cases posed a relatively clear "textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department." 375
The prudential prong of the political question doctrine appeared to be on its last
legs. But in Vieth v. Jubelirer,376 a plurality of the Court held that claims that
political gerrymandering violated constitutional provisions were nonjusticiable
on political question grounds.377 Justice Scalia, speaking for the plurality, noted
the existence of specific constitutional provisions that committed the authority to
intervene in the drawing of congressional district boundaries to Congress.378
Yet, his opinion rested squarely on the second Baker factor, 37 9 "a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" the dispute.380
Justice Scalia explained, "[The judicial power] is the power to act in the manner
traditional for English and American courts. One of the most obvious limitations
imposed by that requirement is that judicial action must be governed by
standard, by rule."3 8 He then criticized the standard for resolving political
gerrymandering cases that Justice Powell had proposed in an earlier decision:382
"It is essentially a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, where all conceivable
factors, none of which is dispositive, are weighed with an eye to ascertaining
whether the particular gerrymander has gone too far-or, in Justice Powell's

or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question." Id.
373. See generallyBarkow, supranote 367, at 300-03 ("In the past few decades, however, the
Supreme Court has become increasingly blind to its limitations as an institution-and,
concomitantly, to the strengths of the political branches . . . ."); Redish, supra note 369, at 1033-39
(discussing whether the political question doctrine still exists today).
374. In Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993), the Court held that Article I, Section 3 of
the United States Constitution confers on the Senate the "sole power" to conduct impeachment
proceedings and, as such, Nixon's claims presented a nonjusticable political question. Id. at 226. In
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court held that the Constitution authorizes the President
to oversee the National Guard. Id. at 6-7 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16; 32 U.S.C. § 110
(2006)). Thus, students' claims arising from the shooting deaths of four Kent State University
students during the Vietnam era, id. at 3-4, presented a nonjusticiable political question. Id. at 1011.
375. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. For example, the Court in Gilligan stated: "It would be difficult
to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental action that was intended by the
Constitution to be left to the political branches directly responsible-as the Judicial Branch is notto the electoral process." Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10. In Nixon, the Court rejected Nixon's argument
that because of the framers' use of "try" in the Impeachment Trial Clause, the judiciary was not
precluded from reviewing Senate impeachment proceedings. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229-30.
376. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
377. Id. at 305-06.
378. See id. at 285.
379. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
380. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 305-06.
381. Id. at 2 78.
382. See id. at 278-79 (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123 (1986)).
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terminology, whether it is not 'fair."' 383 Justice Scalia concluded, "'Fairness'
does not seem to us a judicially manageable standard." 384 Justice Kennedy,
whose fifth vote was necessary to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint, also stressed
the importance of both "the lack of comprehensive and neutral principles for
drawing electoral boundaries" and "the absence of rules to limit and confine
judicial intervention." 3 85
Particularly after the adoption of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, it
is likely that most corporate defendants in public interest tort actions will be able
to remove their cases to federal courts, where federal doctrines governing
jurisdiction, including the political question doctrine, apply. When this does not
occur, the ability of state courts to decline jurisdiction on the basis of a "political
question doctrine" (or a similar state analogue) is less likely than it would be in
the federal courts.
Many state constitutions contain no "case or controversy"
provision.388 The lines between the legislative and judicial functions are often
more blurred in state courts. Arguably, the fact that many state court judges are
democratically elected adds to their legitimacy in handling policy-laden
issues.389 State court judges often zealously guard their role as policymaker
within the common law.
At the same time, state courts frequently decline
jurisdiction because of separation of powers arguments without necessarily using
the label "political question." 391
2.

Climate Change Litigationand the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine

Each of the four federal district courts that considered complaints alleging
that various defendants contributed to global climate change and should be liable
on a public nuisance claim dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it posed
a nonjusticiable political question. 392 One of those four decisions, Connecticut v.

383. Id. at 291.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 306-07 (Kennedy, J., concurring). But Justice Kennedy refused to rule that all
political gerrymandering cases posed political questions and were nonjusticiable: "If workable
standards do emerge ... courts should be prepared to order relief." Id. at 317.
386. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
387. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1863 (2001).

388. Id. at 1879-80.
389. See Hershkoff, supra note 387, at 1887 (quoting Donald W. Brodie & Hans A. Linde,
State Court Review of Adminstrative Action: Prescribingthe Scope of Review, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J.

537, 542). But see supra notes 183-86, 221-22 and accompanying text.
390. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1071-

72 (Ohio 1999) (quoting State ex rel. Bishop v. Bd. of Educ., 40 N.E.2d 913, 919 (Ohio 1942); State
ex rel. Bowman v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 177 N.E. 271, 278 (Ohio 1931)) (reporting on the details of tort

reform as a "struggle ... [that] created turbulence among our coordinate branches of government").
391. See Herschkoff, supra note 387, at 1863 n.159 (listing a number of state courts that have
declined jurisdiction on political question grounds).
392. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 860 (5th Cir. 2009); Native Vill. of Kivalina
v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 883 (N.D. Cal. 2009); California v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
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American Electric Power Co., was subsequently reversed by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals.393
There are two principal objections to the idea that the political question
doctrine is relevant to the new context of public interest tort actions. First, there
is no textual commitment assigning responsibility for addressing global climate
change to the legislative or executive branches.
Indeed, as climate change
litigation proponents will argue, there seems to be a textual commitment of
common law tort actions (including those with public nuisance claims) to the
judicial branch through the "cases" and "controversies" provisions of Article
II.395 But, as highlighted above, the new genre of public interest tort actions,
driven by ideology and alleging harms that are undifferentiated in kind from
those suffered by other members of society, constitutes neither a common law
tort action nor a "case" or "controversy" as those terms were understood at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution or, for that matter, until the mid1990s.396 Moreover, recall that the plurality of the Supreme Court itself appears
to have rested its decision in Vieth on the second and third Baker factors, not on
any Constitutional commitment of the dispute to a coordinate branch of
government.
The second objection to the use of the political question doctrine in this
context is that the doctrine usually applies when plaintiffs claim a constitutional
basis for overturning past decisions of the political branches.3 97 In contrast, in
climate change and other public interest tort actions, the political question
doctrine arguably applies in a private law tort action resting on the common law.
But in recent years, several federal courts of appeals have applied the political
question doctrine to deny jurisdiction in a number of tort actions or actions that
were functionally tort claims. 39 8

No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *48 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007); Connecticut v. Am.
Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
393. 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert.
granted,79 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174).
394. Id. at 325 ("We find no textual commitment in the Constitution that grants the Executive
or Legislative branches responsibility to resolve issues concerning carbon dioxide emissions .... ).
395. Daniel A. Farber, Tort Law in the Era of Climate Change, Katrina,and 9/11: Exploring
Liabilityfor ExtraordinaryRisks, 43 VAL. U. L. REv. 1075, 1094 (2009) ("Courts customarily hear
nuisance cases, so obviously there is no textual constitutional commitment of such issues to another
branch of government, nor is there a lack of sufficient judicial standards in a nuisance case to satisfy
Article III of the Constitution.").
396. See supranotes 146-48, 177-99 and accompanying text.
397. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993) (holding that a challenge to
the Constitution's Impeachment Clause was a nonjusticiable political question); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184 (1992) ("In most of the cases in which the Court has been asked to
apply the [the Constitution's Guarantee] Clause, the Court has found the claims presented to be
nonjusticiable under the 'political question' doctrine.").
398. See, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 846, 851 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (en banc) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs' defamation claim as a nonjusticiable political
question because adjudicating the claim would involve determining the factual validity of the
President's stated reasons for a military strike); Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Serv., Inc.,
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The two federal district courts that dismissed climate change litigation on
political question grounds399 and the federal court of appeals that reached the
contrary conclusion 400 all applied the same Baker factors. 01 Regarding the first
factor-asking whether there was a textual commitment to another branch of
government-both the Second Circuit, which decided American Electric Power
Co., and the Kivalina court agreed that their respective cases did not intrude
upon the political branches' constitutionally delegated authority over foreign
policy.402 The court in Kivalina acknowledged that global climate change had an
"indisputably international dimension" 403 but found this was not enough to place
the issue "beyond the reach of the judiciary." 404 The Second Circuit's
conclusion that a decision from a single federal district court establishing
emissions standards for a handful of domestic defendants "does not establish a
national or international emissions policy" 405 may or may not be convincing
given the precedential value of such a decision, the publicity likely to be
generated by the litigation, and the probability that it will influence others to file
similar litigation. A decision in climate change litigation affects the ability of
the President and his subordinates to negotiate international treaties on limiting
the emissions of greenhouse gases. Nations with competing interests will not
make bargaining concessions of their own in exchange for reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions already ordered by an American court. But many
domestic court decisions may affect international treaty negotiations, and the
mere presence of such an effect does not necessarily render the domestic dispute
nonjusticiable. For example, the implications of products liability litigation may
have an effect on international trade protocols, but typical products liability
actions obviously are justiciable. Accordingly, the American Electric Power Co.
and Kivalina courts' conclusions appear sound-the delegation of foreign policy

572 F.3d 1271, 1278-79, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that the negligence claim of an Army
Sergeant's wife against three companies that contracted with the Army presented a nonjusticiable
political question); Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 46, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that
claims against Japan under the Alien Tort Statute by South Korean, Chinese, Taiwanese, and
Filipino women presented a nonjusticiable political question).
399. See Native Vill. Of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 883 (N.D. Cal.
2009); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *16 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2007). Although the district court in the Comer litigation did not issue a written opinion,
its decision was based on the second and third Baker factors. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585
F.3d at 860 n.2 (5th Cir. 2009).
400. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 79
U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2010) (No. 10-174).
401. See Am. Electric Power Co., 582 F.3d at 324-32; Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 872-77;
Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *13-16.

402. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 323 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962));
Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 873.
403. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 873.
404. Id.
405. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 325.
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matters to the executive and legislative branches does not make climate change
litigation nonjusticiable.406
It is predominantly the second and third Baker factors, the ones given
renewed prominence by Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Vieth, that
determine whether courts should dismiss the climate change cases on political
question grounds. Are there 'judicially discoverable and manageable standards"
for determining if a defendant's activities warrant a finding of liability on public
nuisance grounds; for determining whether the plaintiffs are entitled to
abatement of the public nuisance or only damages as the remedy; or for
judicially establishing the emissions standards used to regulate the defendant's
greenhouse gas emissions? Are these matters ones that are impossible to decide
"without an initial policy determination of a kind for nonjudicial discretion"?
In American Electric Power Co., the Second Circuit concluded that

judicially discoverable and manageable standards to resolve the case were
available both in the Restatement's treatment of the public nuisance tort40 and in
the public nuisance cases that federal courts had previously decided. 408 The
court also held that climate change litigation was not the type of dispute that
required "an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion" before it could act. 40 9 The court reasoned that "if regulatory gaps
exist[ed]" it was appropriate for the "common law [to fill] those interstices."'A0
This statement is obviously an accurate statement of the relationship between the
common law and statutory enactments,411 but it does not address the question of
whether the climate change litigation poses issues of the type that require the
delicate balancing of policy factors rather than the application of rules and
standards capable of being judicially discerned. If so, the political branches are
both the appropriate organs to perform this weighing within our constitutional
structure and the most capable entities of undertaking this process.

406. Without deciding its case on this basis, the federal district court in California v. General
Motors Corp. warned, "Plaintiffs nuisance claims sufficiently implicate the political branches'
powers over ... foreign policy, thereby raising compelling concerns that warn against the exercise
of subject matter jurisdiction on this record." Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *14. The
court had a similar concern about the litigation's impact on interstate commerce, which it argued
was "constitutionally committed to Congress." Id. The Second Circuit refused to consider the
interstate commerce issue in American Electric Power Co., finding that the matters had been
insufficiently briefed by the defendants. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 324.
407. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 328 (defining a public nuisance as "an unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public" (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 821B (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also supra note 203 and
accompanying text.
408. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 326; see also supra notes 207-08 and accompanying

text (discussing further the use of prior public nuisance decisions in American ElectricPower Co.).
409. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 331 (quoting McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc.,
502 F.3d 1331, 1365 (11th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
410. Id. at 330.
411. See Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory

State, 92 IOwA L. REv. 545, 570, 580 (2007).
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The Second Circuit also noted that both Congress and the Executive Branch
had at least indicated concern about global climate change, even if they had not
yet regulated greenhouse gas emissions. 4 12 The court reasoned, therefore, that
judicial regulation of these emissions would not conflict with congressional
policy.413 But recognizing that a problem exists is not the same thing as
balancing the complex ecological, economic, and foreign policy factors
necessary to achieve resolution. For a court to resolve these nationwideindeed, worldwide-issues necessitates initial policy determinations by Congress
or the EPA. Ultimately, the Second Circuit in American Electric Power Co.
erroneously concluded that the action before it seeking to enjoin six utility
companies from contributing to global climate change was just "an ordinary tort
suit." 4 14
It is probably no coincidence that each federal trial court that has ruled on
these issues has reached a contrary conclusion from that of the court in American
Electric Power Co.415 The lower courts have held that judicial standards to
resolve climate change litigation do not exist and that the regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions must await decisions from the political branches of
government. 6 These trial courts, after all, are the courts that would be faced
with establishing the regulatory regime for each specific group of defendants to
govern greenhouse gas emissions if the climate change cases move forward. As
previously mentioned, the Kivalina court found that it lacked judicially
discoverable and manageable standards to reach a principled decision as to
whether defendants' carbon emissions were "unreasonable." As the court noted,
"[A]ny person, entity or industry which uses or consumes such [fossil] fuels

412. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 331-32.

413. Id. at 332.
414. Id. at 331 (quoting McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1365) (internal quotation marks omitted).
415. Compare id. at 326-30 (finding that there are judicially discoverable standards for
resolving global climate change cases), with Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 860 n.2 (5th
Cir. 2009) (noting the district court's finding that there are no judicially discoverable standards to
resolve the climate change claims at issue); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F.
Supp. 2d 863, 876 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (noting the lack of "judicially discoverable and manageable
standards"); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *16 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (same); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that without an initial policy determination from Congress or the
President, the court could not balance the interests required to address a climate change case).
416. E.g., Comer, 585 F.3d at 860 n.2 (noting the trial court's finding that the issue of global
warming has "no place in the court, until such time as Congress enacts legislation which sets
appropriate standards by which this court can measure conduct"); Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 876
("Plaintiffs nor [American Electric Power Co.] offer any guidance as to precisely what judicially
discoverable and manageable standards are to be employed in resolving the claims at issue."); Gen.
Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *16 ("[T]here is a lack of judicially discoverable or
manageable standards by which to properly adjudicate [the p]laintiffs federal common law global
warming nuisance claim."); Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272 (finding that without an
initial policy determination from Congress or the President, the court could not balance the interests
required to address a climate change case).
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bears at least some responsibility for [the p]laintiffs' harm." 417 A socially
optimal resolution to global climate change litigation issues would require the
institution setting emission limits to possess regulatory authority over all parties
that contribute to global climate change. How else could the decisionmaker
perform the necessary utilitarian weighing of the relative costs and benefits of
each emitter's contribution to the collective, indivisible harm? Such a costbenefit analysis is necessary in the first instance to determine whether a public
nuisance exists.418 Further, in litigation seeking injunctive relief, like American
Electric Power Co., weighing costs and benefits plays a critical role in
determining whether the plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief.4 19
Such a massive global and undifferentiated problem is one that must be
addressed by the political branches of government-Congress and the EPAand ultimately by international bodies. Courts are inherently institutionally
incapable of establishing rational, principled criteria for determining which
emissions are "unreasonable" in the context of specific litigation affecting only a
handful of named defendants. There can be no judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for ending or even ameliorating global climate change.
Resolving issues such as which defendant contributed what "amount" of global
climate change, whether that contribution exceeded reasonable levels, and what
should be done about it, is more polycentric, to an exponential degree, than any
set of issues a common law court has ever resolved. Climate change is the
society-wide type of harm that our constitutional structures anticipated the
political branches would handle. It requires a policy decision of the type
appropriate for political institutions deriving their legitimacy from something
other than a court's reasoned elaboration from precedents that bear little or no
resemblance to the problems at hand. In short, if the second and third Baker
factors count for anything, they strongly suggest that climate change litigation is
nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.420

417. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 877 n.4.
418. See id. at 876.
419. A court will engage in "balancing of equities" when determining the appropriateness of
an injunction. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 941 & cmt. a (1979) (noting that "balancing of
equities" also includes consideration of the character of each party's conduct and the interests of
third parties and the general public); see also Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872
(N.Y. 1970) ("The ground for the denial of injunction, notwithstanding the finding both that there is
a nuisance and that plaintiffs have been damaged substantially, is the large disparity in economic
consequences of the nuisance and of the injunction."). For a list of factors courts use to determine
the appropriateness of an injunction, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 936 (1979).
420. The remaining three Baker factors, relating to deference to the political branches and
respect for their actions, appear to have little or no impact in the climate change litigation. For
example, the Second Circuit found that judicial action addressing global climate change would not
implicate the last three Baker factors because the political branches have not reached a "unified
policy on greenhouse gas emissions." Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 331-32. Two of the
federal district courts that ruled that the climate change litigation is nonjusticiable because of
political questions did not find it necessary to address these last three factors. See Kivalina, 663 F.
Supp. 2d at 877 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("Given the Court's conclusions regarding the second and
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Courts should forego jurisdiction over climate change litigation on the basis
of the political question doctrine because of judicial competency concerns and
the appropriate role of courts within our constitutional framework. Admittedly,
employing the political question doctrine to deny jurisdiction in climate change
litigation would extend the doctrine beyond its traditional boundaries.421 But, as
I have explained above, public interest tort actions are very different creatures
from traditional tort actions.422 Only this extension of the political question
doctrine will faithfully serve the values of separation of powers and judicial
competency that undergird all justiciability limitations, including the political
question doctrine.
3.

Beyond Global Warming: The Political Question Doctrine and
Public Nuisance ProductsLitigation

Climate change litigation defendants have raised the political question
doctrine routinely in each and every climate change litigation action. 42 In the
earlier instances of public interest tort litigation-the legal actions against the
manufacturers of handguns and lead pigment-courts almost always dismissed
the public nuisance claims on substantive grounds. 424 Either the facts of these
early cases did not fit within the boundaries of public nuisance liability, 425 or the
harms sustained were derivative or remote from the defendants' actions. 426 But
would the political question doctrine have provided an alternate ground for
dismissal?
At least in some instances, the answer arguably appears to be yes. For
example, prior to the Rhode Island lead pigment litigation,42 7 political bodies in
other jurisdictions, including a federal task force, 428 the Maryland legislature, 429
and the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
governing low-income housing, 4 30 all concluded that only interim controls,4 31

third Baker factors, the Court does not reach the parties['] arguments regarding the remaining Baker
factors which, in any event, largely mirror the argument analyzed above."); Gen. Motors Corp.,
2007 WL 2726871, at *6-16 (determining that the claim was a political question after analyzing
only the first three Baker factors).
421. See supranotes 394-99 and accompanying text.
422. See supra Parts Ill.E, W.A.
423. See supra Part VI.B.2.
424. See supra Part V.A.
425. See supranotes 257-68 and accompanying text.
426. See supranotes 275-87and accompanying text.
427. See supra Part III.C.
428. See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON ENVTL. HEALTH RISKS AND SAFETY RISKS TO
CHILDREN, ELIMINATING CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING: A FEDERAL STRATEGY TARGETING LEAD

PAINT HAzARDs 5 (2000), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/about/fedstrategy
2000.pdf.
429. See MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. §§ 6-801 to 6-852 (LexisNexis 2007).
430. See HUD General Lead-based Paint Requirement and Definitions for All Programs, 24
C.F.R. §§ 35.100-35.175 (2010).
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more modest and more cost-effective hazard-reduction measures than lead
abatement, were warranted. But the Rhode Island trial court took the opposite
approach.432 These other legislative and administrative agencies weighed the
costs and benefits of literally hundreds of different combinations of lead-hazard
reduction measures and came to the conclusion that only measures far more
modest than those that the trial court would have implemented were
warranted. 433 Obviously, the process through which these standards were
determined was not one driven by "judicially discoverable and manageable
standards." Further, the choice of the proper approach to correcting the
conditions that led to childhood lead poisoning was "an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion" of the type usually
required from the politically accountable branches of government. In short, it
appears that if the litigants in the Rhode Island lead pigment litigation had filed
in, or removed the case to, federal court, that court could have dismissed the case
for lack ofjurisdiction on political question grounds.4 34
VII. CONCLUSION

Just an ordinary tort. Or so claim state attorneys general and mass plaintiffs'
attorneys who file public nuisance actions seeking to establish macro-regulatory
regimes when Congress and administrative agencies have failed to act. They see
the flexibility inherent in judge-made common law as a way to remedy what they
view as regulatory dysfunction. These advocates overlook the inherent
limitations of the judicial function, the need for political accountability for those
who establish macro-regulatory policy, and the allocation of powers within our
constitutional framework.
Public interest tort litigation is a new phenomenon, different in kind from
traditional tort law that regulates incrementally as a by product of damages
awarded to particular victims harmed by specific defendants. 435 As Justice
Holmes once wrote, common law "judges do and must legislate, but they can do

431. Interim controls are "measures designed to reduce temporarily human exposure ... to
lead-based paint hazards." § 35.110. Examples of interim controls include painting over paint that
is chipping and reducing dust created by surface friction. § 35.1330.
432. In his instructions to the jury, the trial court judge asked the jury "to determine 'whether
the cumulative presence of lead pigment in paints and coatings in or on buildings ... constitutes a
public nuisance."' State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 442 (R.I. 2008).
433. R.I. DEP'T ATT'Y GEN., RHODE ISLAND LEAD NUISANCE ABATEMENT PLAN 8 (Sept. 14,

2007), reprinted in Rhode Island Defendants to Respond to $2.4B Abatement Plan by Nov. 15,
MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: LEAD 5 attachment 1 (Oct. 10, 2007); GIFFORD, supra note 246, at 143.
434. The Rhode Island Supreme Court also has recognized the political question doctrine. See
City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 57-58 (R.I. 1995) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 516-17 (1999)) (dismissing challenge to statutory scheme for public education funding on
political question and separation of powers grounds).
435. See supra Part III.E.
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so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions."'436
Even more troubling is the fact that public interest tort litigation lacks the
foundations underlying "traditional" public interest tort litigation-constitutional
provisions and federal statutes. Federal statutes reflect past decisions of the
politically accountable Congress. Constitutional provisions reflect a higher order
of authority and legitimacy than does the common law.437 Further, attorneys
filing public interest actions grounded in constitutional and statutory provisions
do not earn billions of dollars in contingent fees, as does the small cadre of
sophisticated mass tort attorneys that usually partners with state attorneys
general and municipal attorneys in their public interest tort actions. 43 8 These
mass plaintiffs' lawyers continually lobby their government partners and
encourage them to litigate a solution to yet another public or environmental
crisis. It would be surprising if a profit motive did not affect which public
health, public safety, and environmental problems attorneys tackle, whether they
pursue legislative or litigation approaches, and which specific defendants they
sue.
Courts should be wary of common law tort actions displaying all of the
following characteristics:
1. The plaintiff files the legal action on behalf of a collective entity,
such as a state as parenspatraie,a municipality, or a class of plaintiffs;
2. The substantive claim represents a collective harm, such as public
nuisance;
3. The scope of the problem identified in the litigation is society-wide,
or even worldwide, in scope, instead of being discrete, circumscribed, or
localized; and
4. The relief requested is injunctive relief. Or, if plaintiffs only seek
damages, there is evidence that the goal of plaintiffs or their attorneys is
to pressure defendants to settle and, in doing so, agree to a judiciallyenforced regulatory regime.

436. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In chemistry,
the weight of a mole depends on the identity of the element or compound. U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, NAT'L INST.

OF STANDARDS

& TECH., NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 330, THE

INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF UNITS (2008). A mole of carbon, for example, weighs twelve grams.

Id. Thus, Justice Holmes's phrase describes motions that are small, albeit some smaller than others.
437. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007) (showing that the
Constitution trumps the common law by striking down a punitive damages award in a common law
tort case on due process grounds); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)
(describing the Constitution as "superior, paramount law").
438. See Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing
DataandNon-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U.L.Q. 653, 720-21 (2003).
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Courts usually dismissed earlier public interest tort cases, those involving
claims against the manufacturers of products that caused public safety and public
health problems. They did so either because governments and other plaintiffs
failed to satisfy the substantive requirements for liability 439 or because the
alleged harms were too remote from the manufacturers' conduct.440 These same
doctrinal pigeonholes do not clearly require dismissal of global climate change
actions. 44 However, climate change actions pose even greater challenges both
to the capabilities of the judicial process and to the constitutional allocation of
powers than did their product-based predecessors. These two fundamental
concepts define how law is made in the United States and lie at the heart of
judicial restraint doctrines, specifically standing and the political question
doctrine.
Judicial restraint doctrines arose in contexts other than common law tort
actions between private parties. But the avant-garde nature of public interest tort
litigation warrants the principled extension of standing and political question
doctrines beyond their prior applications. At times, tort plaintiffs, at least those
asking for relief for society-wide harms, do lack standing. At times, even a tort
action between two private parties poses a political question. These are not
ordinary tort actions.

439. See supranotes 257-68 and accompanying text.
440. See supranotes 275-87 and accompanying text.
441. But see supranote 274 and accompanying text.
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